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CLEANSING MOMENTS AND
RETROSPECTIVE JUSTICE
Margaret M. Russell*

I.

INTRODUCTION:

"

RE -TR YING" RACE

We live in an era of questioning and requestioning long-held
assumptions about the role of race in law, both in criminal prosecu
tions specifically and in the legal process generally. Certainly, the
foundational framework is not new; for decades, both legal literature
and jurisprudence have explored in great detail the realities of racism
in the legal system.1 Even among those who might prefer to ignore the
role of race discrimination in more than two centuries of American
law, denial is no longer a viable or intellectually defensible option.
Rather, debate now centers upon whether or not the extensive history
of American jurisprudential race discrimination should affect the way
we interpret or resolve current doctrinal dilemmas.
Perhaps the most well-known example of this requestioning is the
burgeoning innocence movement, which emerged primarily from
scientific DNA research that established the factual innocence of long-

* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B. 1 979, Princeton. J.D.
1984, Stanford; J.S.M. 1990, Stanford. - Ed. Supriya Bhat '04 and Aryn Pedowitz '04 of the
Santa Clara University School of Law provided excellent research assistance. I owe special
thanks to Anthony V. Alfieri for his prodigious skills in envisioning this essay Colloquium. I
am also grateful to The Center for Social Justice and Public Service at the Santa Clara
University School of Law, which sponsored a symposium in November 2002 to support the
development of scholarly papers for this law review Colloquium. A special thanks to the
following people for their fine work in support of the Santa Clara symposium: Richard
Delgado; Jean Stefancic; Eric K. Yamamoto; Stephanie M. Wildman; and Melanie Esquivel.
Finally, I am especially appreciative of the support of Lee Halterman and Kimiko Russell
Halterrnan.

1. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2001); DAVID
COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE. AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVE·
MENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefanie eds., 2001); GEORGE M. FREDERICK, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY
(2002); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN
THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978); RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998); JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES:
CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO,
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA
(1999).
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incarcerated (including Death· Row) defendants.2 The extraordinary
impact of the innocence movement lies in the compelling simplicity of
its theoretical underpinnings: If innocent people have been and
continue to be incarcerated and even executed, upon what claims of
legitimacy does our criminal justice system rely? Moreover, if innocent
people continue to serve out sentences (and even to await execution
on Death Row), is there not a moral as well as legal imperative to
reopen their cases and correct the past? To the extent that individual
innocence cases may also reveal racial discrimination in the prosecu
tion, conviction, and post-conviction phases, additional attention must
be accorded to the impact of such prejudice upon racial communities
and upon the credibility of the justice system as a whole.3
In a sense, the flip side (yet conceptual companion) of the inno
cence movement is the drive to reopen long-dormant, 1960s civil rights
era prosecutions in an effort to correct both the individualized
injustices and the broad community harms that flowed from those
unresolved investigations and trials. These cases include the murders
of: civil rights leader Medgar Evers; four girls killed in the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham; and civil rights
workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman.4
In these cases, the racism of the era resulted in the failure either to
pursue white supremacists - sometimes because those culpable were
state actors - or to prosecute cases fully and vigorously. As a conse
quence of such malfeasance, white supremacists escaped prosecution
or conviction, and remained at liberty well into old age - sometimes
gloating publicly about the murders. The opportunity to bring these
individuals to trial and possibly to correct the historical record repre
sents what Myrlie Evers, widow of murdered civil rights leader
Medgar Evers, has termed "cleansing moments" - the use of present2. For in-depth consideration of the rise of innocence movements, see BARRY SCHECK
& PETER NEUFELD, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000). For examples of leading innocence
projects, see Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Innocence Project, at http://
innocenceproject.org (last visited June 2, 2003); California Western School of Law Inno
cence Project, at http://www.cwsl.edu/icda/l_Innocence.html (last visited June 2, 2003);
Northwestern University School of Law Center on Wrongful Convictions, at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongfuV (last visited June 2, 2003); and Santa
Clara University School of Law Innocence Project, at http://ncip.scu.edu (last visited June 2,
2003).
3. In January 2003, stating that his state's capital system was "haunted by the demon of
error," particularly with regard to the treatment of racial minorities and poor people, Gov
ernor George Ryan of Illinois commuted the sentences of 1 64 Death Row inmates to life in
prison without possibility of parole. See Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All:
Ryan Commlltes 164 Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole, CHI . TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at
1.

4. See, e.g., J.K. Dineen & Peter De Marco, "Mississippi Burning" Murders; Second
Chance for Justice; Case Building in 1964 Civil Rights Killings, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 3,
2001 , at l; Emily Wagster, Civil Rights Killings Haunt Mississippi, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 2002,
at 6.
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day procedures to accomplish retrospect:ive justice.5 As with innocence
cases, these unfiled or failed prosecutions deserve close scrutiny for
what they may reveal about the illegitimacy of the criminal justice
system, not only for the individuals involved but also for the broader
society that the system is supposed to serve. If racial injustice is
discovered, can it be retried or reopened? Are there extralegal consid
erations that militate in favor of reopening the investigations of such
cases if constitutional double jeopardy or speedy trial objections are
properly addressed?6 Regardless of the outcome of such retried or
reopened race cases, are there broader ameliorative benefits that
communities may experience as a result of the reinvestigation of such
cases? This Essay shall address these questions in the context of
several civil rights era murder prosecutions of the 1960s. It is beyond
the scope of this Essay to address fully the range of complex proce
dural, substantive, and tactical concerns underlying the decisions to
reopen (or not to reopen) particular cases. Rather, the goal is to
examine both the concept of reopening such cases in the search for
racial justice and the broader meanings underlying the impetus to
reopen them.
II.
A.

CIVIL RIGHTS E R A MUR DE RS

The Context: Civil Rights Advances and Supremacist Backlash

To comprehend the enormity of the hate crimes discussed in this
Essay - and the magnitude of efforts to reopen such cases - it is
instructive to recall the tenor of the momentous, tumultuous times in
which they occurred. In the 1950s and 1960s, insurgent social protest
movements - particularly the civil rights movement - propelled
consideration of race and class oppression into public debate nation
wide.7 Thousands of people of all races and backgrounds were inspired
5. Ed Vulliamy, Deep South Confronts Murderous Past, OBSERVER {London), Nov. 14,
1999, at 1. For further discussion of Myrlie Evers and the murder of Medgar Evers, see infra
notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
6. Reopening cases can raise thorny problems with regard to the U.S. Constitution's
Double Jeopardy Clause, see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("(N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . ) and speedy trial guaran
tees, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . . ). For discussion of these considerations in the context
of reopening civil rights era cases, see infra notes 121-139.
"

,

"

7. Richly detailed accounts of this era include: JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981);
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988);
SEPTIMA CLARK, ECHO IN MY SOUL (1962); JAMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1985); DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING
THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (1986); DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(1981); DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE
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by the leadership of individuals such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Rosa
Parks, Ralph Bunche, Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley,
and others who brought the scourge of race discrimination to the fore
fr ont of national discussion. Organizations such as the Congress of
Racial Equality ("CORE"), the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL"), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
("SCLC"), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
("SNCC") energized anti-racist activism in the form of boycotts, sit
ins, pickets, vigils, and litigation; these organizations and others devel
oped specific agendas and targeted strategies for breaking through
barriers to access in the areas of voting, education, employment, and
public accommodations.8 These strategies and agendas unfolded over
a period of many years in order to achieve their intended objectives.
The most famous example is the architecture of the long-term strategy
of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund ("LDF'') to
secure the end of Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal" doctrine of
racial segregation.9 The culmination of LDF's efforts was the Brown v.
Board of Education decision and its desegregation of public education,
but in fact LDF had begun to lay the groundwork for the Brown litiga
tion decades earlier in cases seeking the admission of blacks to state
law schools in Maryland and Missouri.10 Both literally and figuratively,
TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958); GENNA RAE MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
(1983); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984);
HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954-1992 (1993); JUAN
WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-65 (1987); HARRIS
WOFFORD, OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS: MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES (1980).
8. Key biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, and organizational histories of this era
include: CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE
1960s (1981); LEWIS H. FENDERSON, THURGOOD MARSHALL: FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE
(1969); FANNIE Lou HAMER, To PRAISE OUR BRIDGES: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967);
CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1967); DAVID L. LEWIS, KING: A CRITICAL
BIOGRAPHY (1970); AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1973); ANNE MOODY, COMING OF AGE IN MISSISSIPPI (1968);
CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1998); PAT WATIERS, DOWN
TO Now: REFLECTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1971); SHEYANN
WEBB ET AL., SELMA, LORD, SELMA: GIRLHOOD MEMORIES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DAYS
(1980); ROY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY
WILKINS (1982); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
(1998); and HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1965).
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Maryland and Missouri deci
sions are, respectively, University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478 (1936), and Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). For a more detailed description of Brown LDF
strategies and cases, see MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 61-96. See also JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

(1975).
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these legal and political approaches to integration set forth a road map
that - it was hoped - would lead to deep systemic reform; they envi
sioned a late twentieth century in which full equality was supposed to
be thorough, inevitable, and unstoppable.11
Racial supremacists had a far different road map in mind. Even a
brief chronology of pivotal events of the mid-1950s to mid-1960s
conveys an extraordinary cycle of civil rights progress and violent
supremacist backlash. Each major step in the movement for racial
equality was accompanied by massive white resistance. This resistance,
already firmly embedded in American history through the thousands
of lynchings of blacks between the 1880s and the 1950s, continued
even as the numbers of lynchings declined; the Ku Klux Klan and
other white supremacist groups routinely used threats, beatings,
bombings, and murders to ensure that their message of intimidation
and terror endured.12 As Anthony Alfieri has noted, throughout U.S.
history the pattern of federal prosecutorial response to racial violence
generally has been "characterized by inaction and spare enforce
ment."13 During this era, a lack of presidential leadership, combined
with intermittently interventionist federal law enforcement and rare
federal litigation, reinforced white supremacists' sense of superiority
and control.14
11. The failure of American society to progress significantly toward this goal has led
many to doubt the gains of the civil rights era, particularly with respect to test case litigation.
The past decade has seen the emergence of a significant body of literature that questions the
meaning of the Brown legacy, given the persistence of de facto segregation, educational
crises, and racial inequities in public schools. See, e.g., JAMES T. PAITERSON, BROWN v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001);
GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 49-57 (1991); WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
12. See Beth Klopott, Historical Chronology, in BRIDGES AND BOUNDARIES: AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND AMERICAN JEWS 245, 245-58 (Jack Salzman et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Klopott, Historical Chronology]. Bridges and Boundaries traces a pattern of racial progress
accompanied by racial violence. See BRIDGES AND BOUNDARIES, supra. For comprehensive
accounts of the role of lynchings in the antebellum and new South eras, see D ICKSON D.
BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN THE f\NTEBELLUM SOUTH 114-60 (1979); W.
FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 18801930 4-16 (1993). For narratives about massive, violent resistance to racial progress in the
1950s and 1960s, see generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
(1969); HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950s THROUGH THE 1980s (1990).
13. Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1199 (1999). Alfieri's
analysis of present-day racial violence - for example, the highly-publicized 1997 assault of
Abner Louima - is deeply rooted in his examination of lynchings and mob violence
extending back to the Reconstruction Era. Id. at 1185-92.
14. See EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON, BETRAYED: A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
FAILURE TO PROTECT BLACK LIVES (1996). Hutchinson attributes these failures to political
expediency and notes that federal intervention occurred only when black leaders pressured
the federal government to respond "when a violent act triggered a major riot, generated
mass protest, or attracted press attention." Id. at 214. For further background about the role
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Civil rights activists knew that the potential for violent retaliation
was a constant risk, particularly in the South. They knew that self
defense was a key part of their training and that death might result
from their efforts. As a result, the racial climate in which the killings
this Essay focuses on occurred was one in which each murder bore a
distinct, contextual message: hatred of black progress and defense of
racial hierarchy.
A major springboard for this backlash occurred in 1954 when the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education. To the
black community and other supporters of civil rights, the landmark
Brown decision was lauded with "the status of a Magna Carta"15; to
segregationists, it was a rallying cry for massive resistance. As the
Brown mandate was extended to other contexts,16 the segregationist
response remained one of steadfast defiance, usually defended with
the rationale of "states' rights." Constance Baker Motley, one of the
LDF's leading litigators during this period, recalls:
In response to Brown in 1954, the Southern states had resurrected the
basic political themes that guided the South during the Civil War - that
is, nullification and interposition, which affirmed that a state had the
constitutional right to nullify the effectiveness of any federal law or fed
eral court decision with which it disagreed and to interpose its sover
eignty between the decision or law and the federal government. Every
Deep South state had enacted massive resistance laws. The North, East,
and West were too far removed from the bitter afterglow of the Civil
War fully to comprehend this threat to national unity. In some state capi
tals in the Old South, the Confederate flag was still flying or had been
raised anew.17

of presidential leadership in civil rights history, see generally ROBERT FREDERICK BURK,
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (1984); VICTOR S.
NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971); and ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND
DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1965).
15. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 108.
16. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (ending segregation in
municipal parks); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (ending segregation in state court
houses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (ending segregation in intrastate transporta
tion facilities), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Dawson v. City of Baltimore, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (ending segregation in municipal beaches), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955);
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1954) (ending segregation in municipal golf
courses), vacating 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1953); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347
U.S. 971 (1954) (ending segregation in municipal amphitheaters), vacating 202 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1953).
17. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 134-35. For an interesting analysis of the post-Brown
South, asserting that certain moderate southern communities (e.g., Charlotte, North Caro
lina) chose a strategy of controlled accommodation of integration demands to preserve busi
ness interests, see Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the Post-Brown South:
Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 689 (1994). Notes Douglas:
Fearing the negative impact of racial strife on the city's strong economic climate, Charlotte's
white business elite, closely allied with the city's elected officials, took action to fend off
black protest by engaging in voluntary but token integration in advance of most other south-
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Further examples of this massive resistance include the refusal of
state universities to enroll black students who were entitled by law to
attend, the refusal of state courts to order those universities to comply
with Brown when admissions policies were challenged, and the mob
violence that often accompanied black students' attempts to enroll.18
In August 1955, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old black youth from
Chicago, was lynched in Mississippi for flirting with a white girl.19 That
same year, Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to surrender her seat
to a white man on a Montgomery, Alabama, city bus.20 The ensuing
year-long Montgomery Bus Boycott, led by twenty-six-year-old
Martin Luther King, Jr. and others, ultimately resulted in a 1956 U.S.
Supreme Court decision striking down Alabama's intrastate bus
segregation laws.21 Along the way, boycotters and random bystanders
endured an exceptional amount of violence: beatings (including that of
a fifteen-year-old girl), dynamite explosions, shotgun snipers (includ
ing the shooting of a pregnant woman); and church and home
bombings.22 In February 1956, the third month of the boycott, the
Mississippi and Alaba na White Citizens' Councils chose Montgomery
as the site of what they described as "the largest segregation rally of
the century."23 Before a crowd of ten thousand people, Montgomery
city commissioners and other local officials exalted segregation and
exhorted the crowd to defend their state: " 'I am sure that you are not

em cities. What distinguished Charlotte and its moderate counterparts like Atlanta and
Dallas from more obstreperous southern communities like Birmingham and New Orleans
was not so much a philosophical embrace of racial integration but rather a calculated under
standing that controlled desegregation could serve broader economic interests.
ld. at 692.

18. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 112-18 (regarding LDF's litigation to integrate the Uni
versity of Florida Law School); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 210-18. In Mississippi,
the state constitution was amended to allow state officials to close schools to avoid desegre
gation. Id. at 210.
19. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 1 63; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 39-57. The lynching of
Emmett Till - and the acquittal by an all-white, all-male jury of the two white men accused
of murdering him - provoked world-wide shock and condemnation. Despite detailed eye
witness testimony and an identification of Till's mangled corpse by his own mother, the jury
acquitted the two defendants after about an hour of deliberations; the jury foreman later
asserted, "I feel the state failed to prove the identity of the body." Id. at 52. Williams states:
"Some compared events in Mississippi to the Holocaust of Nazi Germany; one writer called
Till America's Anne Frank." Id. In her autobiography, Anne Moody noted: "Before
Emmett Till's murder, I had known the fear of hunger, hell and the Devil. But now there
was a new fear known to me - the fear of being killed just because I was black." Id. at 56
(quoting MOODY, supra note 8, at 107).
20. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 128-29; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 66-67.
21. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). For further background regarding the pivotal
role of the Montgomery Bus Boycott in modern civil rights history, see generally KING, su
pra note 7, and WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 70-89.
22. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 197-200.
23. Id. at 168.
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going to permit the NAACP to control your state,' declared the star
speaker, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, whose 'one prescrip
tion for victory' was for Southern white people to 'organize and be
militant.' "24 That same month, whites at the University of Alabama
rioted in protest against the court-ordered admission of Autherine
Lucy, the first black student in the school's history; the University
responded to the violence by suspending Lucy "for her own safety"; it
took no action against the rioters. Eventually, Lucy withdrew fr om the
University and fr om her litigation because of the failure of federal
authorities (the federal district court, the Court of Appeals, and the
President) to take steps to enforce the courts' orders and to ensure her
physical safety.25
In 1957, the SCLC was established by King, Bayard Rustin, and
Stanley Levinson to organize activities for nonviolent civil rights
groups. That same year, Arkansas used its own state guard to defy
implementation of Brown. After a federal district judge ordered the
admission of black students to Central High School in Little Rock,26
Governor Orval Faubus prevented the "Little Rock Nine" fr om
enrolling, claiming that he had called up the guard to protect the
public order.27 Faubus's open defiance of federal law encouraged mob
rule to surround the school as angry whites jeered the students and
cheered on the troops. When the federal district court again ordered
the school to admit the black students, Faubus ordered all schools
closed for a year. Faubus's assertion of local control over federal
mandate, perceived at the time to be "the most severe test of the
Constitution since the Civil War,"28 resulted in an emergency session
of the U.S. Supreme Court in August 1958. The Court ruled against
Faubus and ordered the students admitted.29 Local white groups again
surrounded the school to prevent its integration until President
Dwight Eisenhower finally ordered a thousand federalized troops to
Little Rock to enforce the integration order.30
24. Id.
25. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 121-24. The decisions in Autherine Lucy's court chal
lenges are: Lucy v. A dams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955), affd, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 {1956) (injunction ordering the University to admit Lucy);
228 F.2d 620 {5th Cir. 1955) {decision that defendant had not violated earlier court order to
admit Lucy).
26. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
27. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 130.
28. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 223.
29. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 {1958).
30. For detailed accounts of the Little Rock crisis, Faubus's intransigence, and
Eisenhower's reluctance to intervene, see BRANCH, supra note 7, at 222-24. See also DAISY
BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A MEMOIR (1962); ELIZABETH HUCKABY,
CRISIS AT CENTRAL HIGH: LITTLE ROCK, 1957-58 (1980); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 901 19. One scholar notes that a 1958 Gallup Poll listed Orval Faubus as one of the ten most

March 2003]

Retrospective Justice

1233

As the 1 950s ended, watered-down, ineffectual civil rights legisla
tion began to emerge from Washington and white supremacist
violence continued to flourish throughout the South.31 In 1959, Mack
Charles Parker, a black man, was lynched in Mississippi after being
abducted by a group of hooded men fr om the Mississippi jail cell
where he awaited trial for the rape of a white woman. An FBI investi
gation established the probable complicity of a local Jaw enforcement
official, but local prosecutors and juries refused to follow up on the
case.32 In 1960, the year that John F. Kennedy was elected president,
CORE sponsored "sit-ins" around the country, beginning with a sit-in
to integrate a Woolworth's lunch counter in Greensboro, North
Carolina.33 That same year, SNCC and the Negro American Labor
Council were established, joining groups such as CORE, the NAACP,
and SCLC in the nonviolent pursuit of social change.34
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925,
which barred discrimination among contractors doing business with
the federal government and required that "affirmative steps" be taken
to recruit and promote minorities.35 That same year, CORE sponsored
an ambitious set of "Freedom Rides" - a term coined to describe the
activities of multiracial groups of nonviolent activists who traveled on
public buses throughout the South to test compliance with the
Supreme Court mandate to desegregate interstate bus facilities. The
Freedom Rides were scheduled to arrive in New Orleans on May 17,
1961, the seventh anniversary of the Brown decision.36 Despite their
optimistic name, the trips were in fact "life-and-death" rides because
of the brutal violence encountered by the riders along the way. For
example, one bus of Freedom Riders was chased down the highway by
approximately fifty cars containing a total of two hundred men:

admired Americans. James T. Patterson, The Troubled Legacy of Brown v. Board, in
BROWN V. BOARD: ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATION, AND WHAT IT LEFT UNDONE 2 (Phillipa
Strum ed., 2002).

31. For a history of the behind-the-scenes evisceration of civil rights protections in the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, see BRANCH, supra note 7, at 220-22.
32. Id. at 257-58.
33. The organizers of the sit-ins intended for them to be a persistent, disciplined, non
violent method of immediately integrating places of public accommodation, public transpor
tation facilities, and other public services; nevertheless, because of segregationist backlash
and resistance, the sit-ins usually resulted in mass arrests, trials, and convictions. As Motley
notes, those who participated in the earliest sit-ins relied upon a "frail legal position" in their
efforts to integrate privately owned facilities, but by the mid-Sixties their efforts were vindi
cated through key U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and through the passage of civil rights
statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 131-32, 196-200 (dis
cussing the sit-ins and LDF victories in five lunch-counter sit-in cases).
34. Klopott, Historical Chronology, supra note 12, at 250.
35. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 413.
36. Patterson, supra note 30, at 5.
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[T]he mob used bricks and a heavy ax to smash the bus windows one by
one, sending shards of glass flying among the passengers inside. The at
tackers ripped open the luggage compartment and battered the exterior
again with pipes, while a group of them tried to force open the door. Fi
nally, someone threw a firebomb through the gaping hole in the back
window. As flames ran along the floor, some of the seats caught fire and
the bus began to fill with black, acrid smoke.37

In the fall of 1962, white supremacists continued literally to wage
war against integration. Over a period of eleven days, James Meredith,
a twenty-nine-year-old black veteran, sought several times to enroll at
the University of Mississippi ("Ole Miss") in Oxford; each time, he
was besieged by hateful mobs.38 Defying a federal court order to admit
Meredith39 and the intervention of the Kennedy Justice Department,
Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett physically blocked Meredith fr om
entering the University. The Mississippi Legislature supported Barnett
by naming him the "emergency university registrar" in an attempt to
evade a court order compelling the regular registrar to admit
Meredith.40 The local press supported Barnett as well; the Jackson
Daily News announced that thousands were ready to "Fight for
Mississippi" and published a "fight song" entitled "Never, No
Never."41 Former Major General Edwin Walker, who had been disci
plined for insubordination and had resigned from the U.S. Army in
protest against what he called the Kennedy Administration's "collabo
ration and collusion with the international Communist conspiracy,"
flew to Mississippi to join forces with Barnett.42 He urged
Mississippians, "Bring your flags, your tents and your skillets! It is
time! Now or never!"43 Barnett and his Lieutenant Governor Paul
Johnson refused to capitulate and were cited for contempt by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.44 Finally, offered a face-saving strategy by
the Kennedy Administration, Barnett formally pretended to accede

37. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 418. For further details about the violence encountered by
Freedom Riders, see JAMES PECK, FREEDOM RIDE (1962), and WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at
144-46, 147-61.
38. These facts are drawn from the following narratives of Meredith's integration of Ole
Miss. See BRANCH, supra note 7, at 633-72; MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 162-93; see also
RUSSELL H. BARRETT, INTEGRATION AT OLE MISS (1965); JAMES H . MEREDITH, THREE
YEARS IN MISSISSIPPI (1 966); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 213-18.
39. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1 962). Meredith's legal challenge to secure
admission to Ole Miss began in May 1961 with Motley and LDF as counsel; the torturous
path of litigation is described in detail in MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 162-92.
40.

BRANCH, supra note 7, at 647.

41. Id. at 653.
42. Id. at 656.
43. Id.
44. Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding Barnett in contempt);
Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 534, 535 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding Johnson in contempt).
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and allow Meredith to register.45 In reality, Barnett allowed unruly
crowds to storm the campus with bulldozers, tear gas, and gunfire; at
least two people died.46 The riot finally subsided after Kennedy
ordered between twelve and sixteen thousand federal troops to restore
order.47 Meredith pursued and completed his college degree with U.S.
marshals accompanying him to class and keeping watch in his dormi
tory room at night.48
B.

The Victims: Lives Lost in the Battle for Racial Supremacy

In this Section, I shall focus primarily on three infamous cases of
the civil rights era: the Evers assassination; the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church bombing; and the Chaney/Schwerner/Goodman
murders. These cases are of looming historical significance for several
reasons. First, they are widely viewed as emblematic of the pervasive
racial hatred and backlash of the era.49 Second, they are cases in which
relatively recent high-profile political and legal efforts resulted in the
reopening of investigations and revival of prosecutions. Finally, the
mixed results of these efforts to "re-try" race provide a useful oppor
tunity to examine the benefits and drawbacks of reopening cases
decades after the underlying crimes occurred.
It may be difficult, fr om the detached complacency of current
experience, to comprehend the reign of terror inflicted by white
supremacists on civil rights workers and on black people in general
during this period. Quite literally, black people and their antiracist
allies of all races risked life and limb to help secure such basic funda
mental rights as the right to vote, to obtain an education, to obtain a
job, and to have access to public accommodations. Some of the
individuals described below lost their lives in the course of purposeful
civil rights activism; others - for example, the four little girls in the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church firebombing - died in the course of
pursuing everyday, nonpolitical activities. In recalling the circum
stances of their murders, one can better understand efforts in subse
quent decades to reopen their cases and to seek retrospective justice.

45. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 656-65.
46. Id. at 666-70.
47. Id. at 668-70.
48. MOTLEY, supra note 8, at 183.
49. For analyses of the phenomenon of racist terror following racial progress, see
HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE (1988), and Michael
Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81-118
(1994).
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Medgar E vers (June 12, 1963, Jackson, Mississippi)

I love the land of my birth. I do not mean just America . . . but Missis
sippi. The things I say . . . will be said to you in hopes of the future when
it will not be the case in Mississippi and America, when we will not have
to hang our heads in shame or hold our breath when the name Missis
sippi is mentioned . . . But instead, we will be anticipating the best.50
At the time of his murder in 1963, Medgar Wylie Evers was one of
the most prominent and well-respected leaders of the civil rights
movement in the South.51 Like his contemporary, Martin Luther King,
Jr., Evers advocated persistent, nonviolent means to dismantle racial
segregation; much of his work involved recruiting new NAACP mem
bers and organizing them to engage in economic boycotts, picket lines,
marches, and prayer vigils. His assassination, which occurred in his
front yard as he returned home to his wife and three young children,
in many ways epitomizes the brutal racism and violence the Old South
used to crush the civil rights movement.
Born on July 2, 1925, near Decatur, Mississippi, Evers was one of
six children of James and Jessie Evers. His father worked in a sawmill
and was deacon for the local church; his mother did laundry for white
families and was also active in church affairs. Inducted into the Army
in 1943, Evers served in England and France, where according to some
accounts his exposure to Europe and experience of fighting against
Nazi supremacism made a deep impression upon his personal and
career goals. After returning home, he finished high school and under
the GI Bill attended Alcorn A & M College in Mississippi. While at
Alcorn A & M, he met and married Myrlie Beasley of Vicksburg,
Mississippi. After Evers's graduation in 1952, they moved to Mound
Bayou, Mississippi, where Evers took a job with Magnolia Mutual
Insurance, one of Mississippi's few black-owned businesses.
Through his work selling insurance policies in rural Mississippi,
Evers saw firsthand the deep poverty of the region's black population
and was inspired to join the NAACP. Soon thereafter, his insurance
work merged with his political activism as he sold insurance policies
and recruited new NAACP members throughout the Mississippi
Delta. Evers worked to establish local NAACP chapters and organ-

50. BOBBY DELAUGHTER, NEVER Too LATE: A PROSECUTOR'S STORY OF JUSTICE IN
THE MEDGAR EVERS CASE 155-56 (2001) (quoting speech of Medgar Evers).
51. The biographical information in this Section is drawn from the following sources
about Medgar Evers's life and career: BRANCH, supra note 7, at 813-16; MYRLIE B. EVERS
WITH WILLIAM PETERS, FOR US, THE LIVING (1967); ADAM NOSSITER, OF LONG
MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS 25-63 (1994); MARY ANNE
VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI 9-13, 38-40, 126-47 (1995); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at
218-25. For further information about Evers, see WILLIE MORRIS, THE G HOSTS OF
MEDGAR EVERS (1998). A popular film about the Evers case, also entitled G HOSTS OF
MISSISSIPPI and directed by Rob Reiner, was released in 1996.
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ized boycotts of gasoline stations and other facilities that refused to
allow blacks to use their restrooms. After the Brown decision in 1954,
Evers tested the waters of the all-white law school of the University of
Mississippi, the state's oldest public university, by applying for admis
sion. His application was rejected. By that time, however, his political
work had attracted the attention of the NAACP's national office. In
1954, the NAACP decided to hire "field secretaries" to coordinate
their work in the Deep South, and hired Evers to be their full-time
field secretary in Mississippi.
After his appointment as field secretary, Medgar and Myrlie Evers
moved to Jackson, Mississippi, where they both worked to establish a
NAACP office. Evers's unique role in Jackson was to bridge the gap
between the younger student generation of civil rights protesters and
the NAACP establishment: "Evers straddled the divide. In his
speeches, he mixed the NAACP's tactics ('Don't shop for anything on
Capitol Street!') with the spirit of the students ('We'll be demonstrat
ing here until freedom comes.')."52 Two of Evers's major tasks in his
new role were to recruit new members and to investigate and publicize
racist violence against blacks. Both challenges proved to be enor
mously difficult in the terrorized atmosphere of the Deep South in
that era. It is hard to overstate the intimidation inflicted by white
supremacists against blacks who sought to join or even listen to the
NAACP and other civil rights organizations. Today, the NAACP's
moderate, nonviolent approach to integration would hardly be
described as revolutionary; however, in Mississippi in the 1950s and
1960s (and, of course, before that time), the NAACP was viewed by
many to be a radical organization, membership in which could lead to
severe reprisals. Despite the constitutional protections recognized by
the Supreme Court in such cases as NAA CP v. Alabama53 and
NAA CP v. Button,54 the reality for blacks was that Mississippi was a
state with more recorded lynchings than any other in the country.
Judicial pronouncements of First Amendment fr eedoms of expression
and association were virtually meaningless in the face of assault,
harassment, and even murder for any kind of political action. For civil
rights activists and anyone who dared listen to them, it was a war zone.
Given this climate of terror, Evers faced even more obstacles as he
sought to research Mississippi's history of lynchings and to organize
opposition to racist violence. He was stalked, threatened, and physi-

52. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 815.
53. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAA CP v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
state of Alabama could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists because
such enfo rced disclosure would violate the First Amendment right to freedom of association.
54. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In NAA CP v. Button, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
NAACP's sponsorship of civil rights litigation was expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.
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cally assaulted as he traveled throughout Mississippi. Organizations
both private (the White Citizens' Council) and public (the Mississippi
Sovereignty Commission) spied on him. Nevertheless, Evers persisted
in organizing against Jim Crow segregation in restaurants, gas stations,
and movie theaters, as well as public libraries, parks, and pools. His
pivotal role in a boycott against Jackson merchants garnered national
attention in the early 1960s, as did his efforts on behalf of James
Meredith in the battle to integrate the University of Mississippi in
1962.
The much-admired Evers was bitterly hated as well. Threats of
violence to Evers were so common that in May 1963, a month before
he was murdered, the garage to his home was bombed. Medgar and
Myrlie Evers had trained their three children to "drop and hit the
floor" if they heard a gunshot or other violent activity in their vicinity.
Just before midnight on June 11, 1963, Evers returned home from
a NAACP strategy session. As he stepped out of his Oldsmobile,
carrying a stack of NAACP shirts stenciled with the message "Jim
Crow Must Go," he was shot by a killer who hid in nearby bushes. In
Parting the Waters, a landmark chronicle of the early civil rights
movement, historian Taylor Branch describes the event:
His own white dress shirt made a perfect target for the killer waiting in a
fragrant stand of honeysuckle across the street. One loud crack sent a
bullet from a .30-'06 deer rifle exploding through his back, out the front
of his chest, and on through his living room window to spend itself
against the kitchen refrigerator. True to their rigorous training in civil
rights preparedness, the four people inside dived to the floor like soldiers
in a foxhole . . . [T]hey all ran outside to find him lying facedown near
the door. "Please Daddy, please get up!" cried the children . . . . The vic
tim said nothing until neighbors and police hoisted the mess of him onto
a mattress and into a station wagon. "Sit me up!" he ordered sharply,
then, "Turn me loose!" These were the last words of Medgar Evers, who
was pronounced dead an hour later. 55
The accused lone gunman, a white supremacist named Byron De
La Beckwith, stood trial twice in state court in 1964 for Evers's
55. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 825. Ironically, even before Evers's murder, June 11 had
already marked a pivotal moment in national affairs regarding race relations.That evening,
President Kennedy had delivered a nationally televised speech in response to unfo lding civil
rights crises and to Martin Luther King's plea that the Administration speak out on racial
justice as a "just and moral issue." Kennedy's speech included the following:
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it. And we cherish our freedom here at
home. But are we to say to the world - and much more importantly, to each other - that
this is the land of the free, except for Negroes, that we have no second-class citizens, except
Negroes, that we have no class or caste system, no ghettos, no master race, except with re
spect to Negroes? ... Now the time has come for this nation to fulfill its promise.... We
face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and a people... . A great change is at hand, and
our task, our obligation, is to make that revolution, that change, peaceful and constructive
for all.
Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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murder. In both state prosecutions, the all-white juries had hung
verdicts.56 Throughout the next three decades, Byron De La Beckwith
remained free, reportedly during this time gloating to random indi
viduals that he had "gotten away with" Evers's murder. In 1990, the
case was reopened based on new evidence. In 1994, Beckwith was
tried a third time; this time, the prosecution. resulted in a conviction,
and Beckwith was sentenced to life in prison.57
2.

Addie Mae Collins, Denise McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia
Wesley (September 15, 1963, Birmingham, Alabama)

Unlike Medgar Evers, the four murder victims in the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church bombing were not outspoken civil rights activ
ists. They had not recruited NAACP members or organized boycotts
or stood on picket lines or investigated lynchings. They were children.
Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley, and Carole Robertson were four
teen at the time of their deaths; Denise McNair was eleven.58 Still, the
retaliatory message conveyed by the bomb that killed them was quite
clear. The Birmingham public schools had been desegregated only five
days before, and bombs were the Klan's quick response. Birmingham
was a city that had become so violent with racist resistance that it was
nicknamed "Bombingham."59 One area of the city was nicknamed
"Dynamite Hill" because of the number of blacks' homes that had
been blown up by dynamite sticks attached to bricks and thrown
through windows or placed in letterboxes.6() On April 12, 1963 (Good
56. The two 1964 State v. De La Beckwith trials were conducted in the Circuit Court of
the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. For more extensive discussions of the
first and second trials, see DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 201-02; NOSSITER, supra note 51,
at 105-09, 132-34; and VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 160-84, 203-08. In interviews, Myrlie Evers
has stated that during her testimony in the first trial, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett
entered the courtroom, looked at her, and walked over to Beckwith to shake his hand. She
also recalls: "This man was accorded a major parade along the route of the highway on his
way home [after the hung jury decision]. People had banners that were waved, welcoming
the hero home. The accused killer also made a statement to the press that he was glad to
have gotten rid of 'varmints.' WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 224.
"

57. The third State v. De La Beckwith trial was conducted in the Circuit Court of the
First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi in 1994. See William Booth, Beckwith
Boasted of Killing, Jury Told; Witnesses Recall Words of Defendant Accused in 1963 Evers
Slaying, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1994, at A3; Mike Smith, A round the South Region in Brief:
Surprise Witness Cites Beckwith Boast, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 2, 1964, at A 3; Jury Delib
erates in Beckwith 's Third Trial, Fr. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1994, at SA. For
a detailed account of the 1994 trial, see NOSSITER, supra note 51, at 249-57, and VOLLERS,
supra note 51, at 328-86. The disposition of Beckwith's final appeal may be found in De La
Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1997) .
58. Emma Lindsay, Observer Magazine: Dispatches, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 8, 2002
(Magazine), at 31. Addie Mae's younger sister Sarah, also in the church basement that day,
survived but lost an eye in the blast. Id.
59. Id. ·
60. Id.; see also BRANCH, supra note 7, at 793-96, 888-92.
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Friday), Martin Luther King was arrested for leading a demonstration
in defiance of a court order, and while incarcerated wrote "Letter
from Birmingham Jail," a lasting epistle about the necessity for
nonviolent resistance to segregation.61 In the midst of this turmoil, the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church had become a focal point for political
as well as religious activity. Like other churches, it thus became a
desirable site for the Klan's bombs and burnings.
Taylor Branch recounts this critical moment in civil rights history:
Sunday [September 15] was the annual Youth Day at the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church. Mamie H. Grier, superintendent of the Sunday
school, stopped in at the basement ladies' room to find four young girls
who had left Bible classes early and were talking excitedly about the be
ginning of the school year. . . . They were engaged in a lively debate on
the lesson topic, "The Love That Forgives," when a loud earthquake
shook the entire church and showered the classroom with plaster and
debris . . . McNair searched desperately for her only child until she came
upon a sobbing old man and screamed, "Daddy, I can't find Denise! "
The man helplessly replied, "She's dead, baby. I've got one of her shoes."
He held a girl's white dress shoe, and the look on his daughter's face
made him scream out, "I'd like to blow the whole town up!''62
The murder of the four young girls in the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church marked the nadir of the early 1960s civil rights movement and
galvanized the nation to respond. Despite the fact that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") identified four Klan members as
suspects within days of the bombing, however, federal prosecutors did
not bring charges. In 1977, fourteen years later, a state prosecution
and conviction of one of the bombers occurred: Robert "Dynamite

61. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 187-89 fo r the full text of King's famous letter. See
also MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT {1964). For a more extensive de
scription of the volatile nature of events in Birmingham in the spring and summer of 1963,
see WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 179-95.
Events in Birmingham that year served as both symbol and rallying cry fo r white su
premacists throughout the South. For example, a June 9, 1963 advertisement - sponsored
by the "Dallas County Citizens' Council" - in the Selma Times-Journal recruited members
with the fo llowing language:
A SK YOUR SELF THI S IMPORTANT QUE STION: WHAT HAVE I PER SONALLY
DONE TO MAINTAIN SEGREGATION? ... Is it worth four dollars to prevent a "Bir
mingham" here? That's what it costs to be a member of your Citizens Council, whose efforts
are not thwarted by courts which give sit-in demonstrators legal immunity, prevent school
boards from expelling students who participate in mob activities and would place federal
referees at the board of voter registrars.. . . Is it worth four dollars to you to prevent sit-ins,
mob marches, and wholesale Negro voter registration efforts in Selma?
J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L.
CHESTNUT, JR. 167 (1 990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. BRANCH, supra note 7, at 889. In 1997, Spike Lee produced and directed a docu
mentary entitled Four Little Girls about the Birmingham church bombing. FOUR LITTLE
GIRLS (HBO 1997).
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Bob" Chambliss died in jail in 1985.63 A second suspect, Herman Cash,
was never charged; he died in 1994.64 The case lay dormant through
the 1980s and 1990s; it was reopened by state prosecutors in 2001. The
last two suspects, Thomas Blanton, Jr. and Bobby Frank Cherry, were
convicted in 2001 and 2002, respectively - nearly forty years after the
four girls' deaths.65
3.

James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman (June 21,
1964, Philadelphia, Mississippi).

A discernible trajectory of white supremacist violence links the
murders of Medgar Evers in June 1963, the children of the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church bombing in September 1963, and a trio of civil
rights workers - James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew
Goodman - i n June 1964. As each tragedy sparked a more
determined wave of civil rights activism, white Southern backlash
continued to grow as well. The familiar pattern of brutal terror, civil
rights progress, and even more brutal terror was epitomized in the
lynchings of Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman, carried out under the
leadership of government offici als who were members of the Ku Klux
Klan.66
Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman met through their work with
the Mississippi Summer Project, which was conceived in 1963 by the
Council of Federal Organizations ("CFO"), a statewide coalition of

63. Vulliamy, supra note 5, at 1. In 1 977, the State of Alabama v. Chambliss trial was
conducted in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The final disposition on appeal may be fo und in
Chambliss v. State of Alabama, 373 So.2d 1185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
64. Bob Johnson, Church Bomber's Attorney Asks for New Trial, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES, July 9,2002, at BS; Justice in Birmingham, HERALD ( Rock Hill, S.C.), May 26, 2002,
at 2E; see also Lindsay, supra note 58, at 32; Church Bombing Trial in Birmingham, Ala
bama, and Civil Rights Era Hate Crimes (National Public Radio broadcast, May 21, 2002).
For further background on the significance of this case, see GLENN T. ESKEW, BUT FOR
BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE
(1997).

65. See Philip Delves Broughton, Klansman Given Life for 1963 Killings, DAILY TEL.
(London), May2,2001, at 15; Gregory Kane, Conviction in Bombing of Church Brings Only
a Measure ofJustice, BALT. SUN, May26,2002, at 3B; Lindsay, supra note 58, at 32; Morning
Ku Klux Klan Member Thomas Blanton Jr. Convicted of Killing Four Girls at 16th Street
Baptist Church in .1963 (National Public Radio broadcast, May 2,2001). The final appeal of
Blanton may be fo und at Ex Parte Blanton, 836 So.2d 1013 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (decision
without published opinion).
66. The fo llowing account of the murders is drawn from Douglas 0. Linder, The Missis
sippi Burning Trial (U.S. vs. Price et al.): A Trial Account, at http://www.Iaw.umkc.edu/
faculty/projects/ftrials/price&bowers/Account.html (last visited June 2, 2003). For a full ac
count of this case, see SETH CAGIN & PHILIP D RAy' WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF
GOODMAN, SCHWERNER, AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR
MISSISSIPPI (1988). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 230-32, 234-36; Klopott, Historical
Chronology, supra note 12, at222-23. In 1988, Orion Pictures released Mississippi Burning, a
Hollywood drama based on this case. MISSISSIPPI BURNING (Orion Pictures 1988).
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CORE, SNCC, NAACP, and SCLC. The Project's goal was to recruit
several thousand northern college students to Mississippi in the
summer of 1964 to engage in a "Freedom Summer" of voter registra
tion and other civil rights work. The Project's leadership thought that
the large numbers of young white northerners would attract national
attention and thereby help protect local blacks against harassment by
the police and local whites. Michael Schwemer, a white, Jewish
twenty-four-year-old from New York, and James Chaney, a black
twenty-one-year-old from Meridian, Mississippi, were CORE staff
members heavily involved in planning for the Summer Project. As the
Project's planning intensified in the early months of 1964, so did the
Klan's response; in February 1964, the White Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan held a founding meeting, and on one day in April the Klan
burned crosses at sixty-one separate locations throughout Mississippi.
In May 1964, Sam Bowers, the Imperial Wizard of the Klan in
Mississippi, embarked on a plan to kill Michael Schwemer, who as the
first white civil rights worker based outside of Jackson had gained
particular notoriety with the Klan. Schwemer, nicknamed "Goatee"
and "Jew-Boy" by Bowers and his followers, had helped to organize a
black boycott of white-owned businesses in Meridian and had also
spearheaded a voter registration drive there. On Memorial Day in
1964, Michael Schwemer and James Chaney visited the black Mount
Zion Methodist Church in Neshoba County to urge voter registration
and to ask the congregation's permission to use the church as the site
of a "Freedom School" that summer.
The Klan first attempted to kill Schwerner on June 16, 1964, when
it expected Schwerner to return to Mount Zion Methodist Church for
a business meeting. Late that night, ten black church leaders left
Mount Zion and fo und thirty Klan members lined up in military
formation with rifles and guns; more Klan members formed a barrier
at the rear of the church. When the Klan members discovered that
Schwemer was not at the church that night, they went on to beat the
church leaders and to burn the church to the ground. The Mount Zion
Methodist Church was one of twenty Mississippi black churches fire
bombed in the summer of 1964; when the FBI began its investigation
of the firebombing, it adopted as its codename "MIBURN," for
"Mississippi Burning."
The Klan's initial assassination attempt was unsuccessful because
at the time of the church firebombing, Schwemer and Chaney were in
Oxford, Ohio, at a training session for the Mississippi Summer Project.
Among the new trainees was Andrew Goodman, a twenty-year-old
Queens College student from New York; Schwerner persuaded
Goodman to return with him and Chaney to Meridian for Summer
Project work. On June 20, Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman drove
back together to Meridian and then on to Neshoba County to inspect
the remains of the Mount Zion Methodist Church. On June 21, the
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three visited the burned-out church and ·interviewed several congrega
tion members to learn more about the incident. While visiting the
home of one congregation member, they were warned that a group of
white men was looking for them. The three decided to leave Neshoba
County at 3 p.m. Prepared for the worst, Schwerner told a worker in
the Meridian CORE office to expect the three back by 4 p.m. and to
start making telephone calls about their whereabouts if they did not
return by 4:30 p.m. Expecting a possible ambush on one of the two
routes back to Meridian, they decided to take the less direct route
west through Philadelphia, the county seat.
Just inside the Philadelphia city limits, Chaney, Schwerner, and
Goodman encountered Neshoba County Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price.
Both Price and the Neshoba County Sheriff, Lawrence Rainey, were
Klan members; as police officers, both had reputations for being tough
with blacks and others who tried to "meddle" with the segregationist
status quo. Price arrested the three on suspicion for having been
involved in the church arson and took them to the county jail. Price
then contacted Edgar Ray Killen, the "kleagle" (or recruiter) for the
Neshoba County Klan. According to Douglas 0. Linder:
Some of what happened over the next seven hours in the Neshoba
County jail is known . . . . We know that shortly after 10 p.m., Cecil Price
showed up at the jail, telling the jailer, "Chaney wants to pay off - we'll
let him pay off and release them all." Price led them to their parked car,
then tailed them as they headed east out of town on Highway 19.
The three civil rights workers by then no doubt suspected that they were
being led into a trap, and in fact they were. Since receiving word from
Price that Schwerner had been captured, Edgar Ray Killen, the Klan
kleagle and an ordained Baptist minister, had been busy recruiting mem
bers of the Neshoba and Lauderdale County klaverns for some "buttrip
ping," as he put it. An afternoon meeting at the Longhorn Drive-In in
Meridian with local Klan bigwigs was followed by a later meeting at
Akin's Mobile Homes with eager, younger members who would partici
pate in the actual killings. Killen told the dozen or more recruits i.o buy
rubber gloves and to be in Philadelphia by 8:15 p.m. After offering the
Klan men a drive-by tour of the Neshoba County jail and going over the
details of the planned release, Killen headed off to see a departed uncle
at the local funeral home and to thereby establish his alibi.67

Despite the efforts of Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman to elude
Price and the cars full of young Klan members who pursued them on
Highway 19, they eventually stopped their car and surrendered.
According to Linder's account:
Soon three cars, Price's and two full of Klan members, were traveling in
a procession down an unmarked dirt turnoff called Rock Cut Road.

67. Linder, supra note 66.
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It is not known whether the three were beaten before they were killed.
What is known is that a twenty-six-year-old dishonorably discharged ex
marine, Wayne Roberts, was the trigger man, shooting first Schwerner,
then Goodman, then Chaney, all at point blank range. . . . The bodies of
the three civil rights workers were taken to a dam site at the 253-acre Old
Jolly Farm. The farm was owned by Philadelphia businessman Olen Bur
rage, who reportedly had announced at a Klan meeting when the im
pending arrival in Mississippi of an army of civil rights workers was dis
cussed, "Hell, I've got a dam that'll hold a hundred of them." The bodies
were placed together in a hollow at a dam site and then covered with
tons of dirt by a Caterpillar D-4.68

Within days of the first reports of the disappearance of C haney,
Schwerner, and Goodman, there was an unprecedented response on a
national level. On June 22, the FBI began an investigation; in the next
month, they would go on to interview about 1 ,000 Mississippians,
including 500 Klan members. On June 23, President Lyndon Baines
Johnson met with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and others
to discuss the possibility of a formal Administration role in the
Mississippi crisis. On June 24, national black leaders James Farmer,
John Lewis, and Dick Gregory met in Philadelphia with Neshoba
County officials. By June 25, the federal military had arrived; busloads
of sailors and divers worked their way through Mississippi swamps and
woods in search of the three bodies. On July 10, J. Edgar Hoover
arrived in Jackson to open an FBI office.
After several weeks of investigation and a promise of $30,000 in
reward money, the FBI learned the probable location of the bodies on
July 31. On August 3, the FBI obtained a search warrant to look for
the bodies in an earthen dam at the Old Jolly Farm; on August 4, the
bodies of Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman were unearthed.69
There was an extraordinary difference between the national atten
tion accorded the disappearance of Chaney, Schwemer, and Goodman
and that given to the murders of Medgar Evers and the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church victims. The tragic irony of the Summer
Project's aim to attract white northerners to the South to conduct
voter registration was that it was all too astute. The presence of white
northerners drew more attention to the Summer Project, and the
deaths of white northerners finally drew sustained attention to the
reign of racist terror in the South. Ella Baker, a founder of SNCC and
executive director of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's
Washington office, noted:
The unfortunate thing is that it took this kind of symbol to make the rest

68. Id.
69. Id. For further background on the role of the FBI in investigating this case, see D ON
WHITEHEAD, A TTACK ON TERROR: THE FBI AGAINST THE KU KLUX KLAN IN MISSISSIPPI
{1970).
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of the country turn its eyes on the fact ttiat there are other bodies lying
under the swamps of Mississippi. Until the killing of a black mother's son
becomes as important as the killing of a white mother's son, we who be
lieve in freedom cannot rest.70

Rita Schwerner, Michael Schwerner's widow, agreed:
It's tragic as far as I'm concerned that white northerners have to be
caught up in the machinery of injustice and indifference in the South be
fore the American people register concern. I personally suspect that if
Mr. Chaney who is a native Mississippian Negro had been alone at the
time of the disappearance that this case like so many others that have
come before would have gone completely unnoticed.71
Despite the attention accorded to the Chaney, Schwerner, and
Goodman killings, the state of Mississippi never brought a murder
prosecution in the case. In 1967, eighteen individuals, including
Deputy Sheriff Price, Klan kleagle Killen, and Klan Imperial Wizard
Sam Bowers, were charged in a federal civil rights conspiracy trial.
Price, Bowers, and five others were convicted. There were hung jury
verdicts on Killen and two others; eight were acquitted. With half of
the original eighteen defendants still alive in 2002, there is still a strong
movement among Chaney/Schwerner/Goodman family members and
supporters to reopen the murder investigation before it is too late.72
•

4.

Other Victims, Named and Unnamed

Unsurprisingly, the reign of terror did not end with the deaths of
Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman. As just one example, authorities
searching for the three men's bodies in the summer of 1964 discovered
the decomposing bodies of two others, Charles Moore and Henry
Dee, in a Louisiana swamp. Both cases were dormant until 1999.73 In
February 1965, Jimmie Lee Jackson, a young black civil rights activist,
was shot and killed by a state trooper at a voting rights march in
Marion, Alabama.74 That same year in Alabama, Viola Gregg Liuzzo,
a thirty-nine-year-old white homemaker and activist from Detroit, was
shot to death on U.S. 80 during the Selma-to-Montgomery Freedom
70. Klopott, Historical Chronology, supra note 12, at 223 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Jerry Mitchell, Families Still Seek Justice, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June
21,2002, at lA. The federal civil rights convictions were upheld in United States v. Price, 383
U. S. 787 (1966).
73. Tatsha Robertson, Righting Our Uncivilized Wrongs: Reopened Race Murder Cases
May Yet Add Justice to an Era, BOSTON G LOBE, May 6,2001, at El; Vulliamy, supra note 5,
at 1.
74. CHESTNUT & CASS, supra note 61, at204; Mae Gentry, Witness to Terror: Pastor's
Daughter Remembers Friends Killed in '63 Bombing, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 20,2003, at
lJA.
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March led by Martin Luther King, Jr.75; Jonathan Daniels, a twenty
six-year-old white Episcopal seminary student from New Hampshire,
was shot during a voter registration drive in Lowndes County,
Alabama;76 James Reeb, a thirty-eight-year-old Unitarian minister,
was beaten to death in Selma.77
Civil rights activists were not the sole targets of white supremacist
violence; sometimes blacks lost their lives simply for exercising basic
human rights such as pursuing a job or walking down the street in
white neighborhoods. In April 1970, Rainey Pool, a black sharecrop
per, died fr om a brutal beating in Midnight, Mississippi - apparently
just for being black in the wrong place at the wrong time.78 In
September 1968, Carol Jenkins, a twenty-one-year-old black woman,
died from stab wounds on a street in Martinsville, Indiana; she had
been trying to sell encyclopedias door-to-door after a strike closed the
factory where she worked. After decades of dormancy, police finally
made an arrest in the Jenkins case in the fall of 2000 after a forty-year
old woman came forward and disclosed that as a little girl she had seen
her father and another white man chase Jenkins down the street and
stab her in the chest with a screwdriver. According to the daughter,
her father and the other man had laughed after the incident, claiming
that Jenkins "got what [she] deserved."79 The state dropped murder
charges in the case after the defendant died from cancer in 2002.80
It is not known exactly how many more murder victims of white
supremacists in this era remain unidentified or are simply lost to
75. See MARY STANTON, FROM SELMA TO SORROW: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF VIOLA
L1uzzo 5 (1998). After two state court acquittals of the defendants charged in her murder,
federal criminal civil rights prosecutions resulted in convictions of Robert Creel, William
Orville Eaton, Eugene Thomas, and Collie Leroy Wilkins. See Frank Judge, Slaying the
Dragon, A M. LAW., Sept. 1 987, at 83, 87.
76. CHESTNUT & CASS, supra note 61, at 121; Tim Unsworth, Murder in Black and
White; 1967 Shooting of Two Clergy in Lowndes County, Alabama, U.S. CATH., Mar. 1998,
at 35; Youths Remember Civil Rights Hero, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1999, at 018. In 1 965,
an all-white jury acquitted Thomas Coleman, a deputy sheriff, of manslaughter charges in
ninety minutes. Coleman died from cancer in 1 997.
77. Jonathan L. Entin, Viola Liuzzo and the Gendered Politics of Martyrdom,23 H ARV.
WOMEN'S L.J.249 (2000) (reviewing STANTON, supra note 75). Three men - Elmer Cook,
O'Neal (Duck) Hoggle, and Stanley Hoggle - were tried and acquitted in 1965. See Breach
of Faith: Murder in Selma (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 5, 2000, Transcript #
00030500V55).
78. Vulliamy, supra note 5, at 1. In 1999, the reopened case resulted in the convictions of
James Caston, Charles Caston, Hal Crimm, and Joe Oliver Watson, and the acquittal of
Dennis Howell Newton.Two others charged in the crime died befo re being brought to trial.
Timothy R. Brown, Three on Trial in Decades-Old Murder of Black Man, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 10, 1999, at Al6. The convictions of Caston, Caston, and Crimm
were upheld in Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473 (Miss.2002).
79. Sara Rimer, After Arrest, Town Shamed By '68 Killing Seeks Renewal, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17,2002, at A18.
80. Bruce C. Smith, Judge Dismisses 1968 Murder Case, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 1,
2002, at B2.
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history entirely. In May 2002, Mark Potok, Director of the Southern
Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Project, estimated that there are
approximately twenty cases of such murders that are either still open
or are ripe for reopening.81 As for the unknown bodies in swamps,
ditches, and dams, Potok paraphrases a local saying that he had heard:
" [W]hen the Archangel Gabriel blows his trumpet . . . so many people
will rise up out of the rivers from those years that you'll be able to
walk from one side to the other dry-footed."82
III. WHY REOPEN?
A.

BENEFITS AND BARRIERS

Legal Accountability

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the murders of Evers,
Collins, Wesley, Robertson, McNair, Chaney, Schwerner, and
Goodman were not just individual acts - nor were the murders of
Parker, Jackson, Liuzzo, Jenkins, Moore, Dee, Pool, Penn, Till, or the
thousands of others v:ctimized by racial supremacists over the course
of this nation's history. Rather, they were part of a larger mosaic of
violent acts against blacks, Jews, and others who threatened the so
called "white Christian republic." Although these murders were not
formally linked, the connections between them and widespread racial
hatred were neither vague nor attenuated. The pattern of supremacist
lawlessness in defiance of civil rights progress sent a clear message that
the price of equality would be death, torture, and dismemberment.
This message continues today in the form of race-based hate crimes
throughout the nation.83
Given the continuing reality of racially-motivated violence and
hatred in this country, reopening long-dormant cases may result in
legal accountability for both government and private malfeasance. The
murders discussed in Part II occurred not only because of the criminal
acts of private individuals, but also because of the complicity of law
enforcement and other government actors. Moreover, the history of
failed or unfiled murder prosecutions in these cases - despite strong
evidence pointing toward the culpability of public and private actors
- magnifies the need to "correct the record" so that the legitimacy of
the legal system itself is not further undermined.
In her recent work on legal and extralegal responses to collective
81. Church Bombing Trial in Birmingham, Alabama, and Civil Rights Era Hate Crimes,
supra note 64.
82. Id.
83. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, at www.splcenter.org/intelligence
project/ip-index.html (last visited July 7, 2003). The Southern Poverty Law Center publishes
a quarterly report of bias crimes, the "Intelligence Report," that is listed on the Center's site.
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atrocities, Martha Minow considers a range of choices facing societies
as they emerge from histories of mass violence. Analyzing the experi
ences of nations in Europe, Latin America, and Africa in dealing with
the aftermath of widespread societal violence, Minow raises a series of
important questions regarding the role of prosecutions in securing jus
tice and truth:
Perhaps there simply are two purposes animating societal responses to
collective violence: justice and truth. Justice may call for truth but also
demands accountability. And the institutions for securing accountability
- notably, trial courts - may impede or ignore truth. Democratic guar
antees protecting the rights of defe ndants place those rights at least in
part ahead of truth-seeking; undemocratic trials may proceed to judg
ment and punishment with disregard for particular truths or their com
plex implications beyond particular defendants. Then the question be
comes: Should justice or truth take precedence? Of what value are facts
without justice? If accountability is the aim, does it require legal pro
ceedings and punishment? Do legal proceedings generate knowledge?84
Although differences certainly exist between the regimes
examined by Minow and American anti-black violence in the 1960s,
similar issues of accountability and retrospective justice arise in deal
ing with the aftermath of state-sanctioned malfeasance. Reopening
civil rights era cases is an important public response to collective
violence and atrocities against blacks, such as those discussed in Part
II of this Essay. By aiming to foster justice, truth, and accountability,
these proceedings generate lasting records of both specific misdeeds
and less tangible harms. l refer to these categories of accountability as
government malfeasance and individual malfeasance in Parts 111.A.1
and 111.A.2 below.
·

84. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 9 (1998) (internal
citations omitted). In this work, Minow cites an organization, Facing History and Ourselves,
which supports continuing awareness and exploration of "possible institutional responses to
collective violence, genocide, apartheid, and torture." Id. at 6-7. She asks a series of ques
tions that could usefully be applied to awareness of civil rights era atrocities in the United
States:
What lessons can be learned - and what should be taught - to young people growing up in
a world that has known, and still produces incomprehensible patterns of violence and tor
ture? Would it be better to shield young people from the fact of those patterns until they
grow up? The wager made by programs like Facing History and Ourselves is that young
people would do better to learn about the horrors that have occurred at the hands of adults
than to be subject to silence about the events that still shape their world. Young people, un
derstandably, want to know what has been done, and what can be done, to respond, redress,
and prevent future occurrences. They ask whether it is possible to find a stance between
vengeance and forgiveness, a stance for survivors, bystanders, and the next generations.
ld. at 7.
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Government Malfeasance

Government malfeasance - whether stemming from complicity in
the failure to prosecute or in prosecutorial overreaching - fundamen
tally skews the nature of the criminal process and reinforces skepti
cism in the validity of its outcomes. If accountability is achievable in
such cases, there must be opportunities to reopen investigations, even
decades later, to question the government's role.85 Although the
imperatives of individual defendants' rights warrant respect for the
values of finality and closure, there must be options in extraordinary
cases to recognize and counteract the malfeasance of the state.
The prosecutions of Byron De La Beckwith for the murder of
Medgar Evers constituted one such extraordinary case, rooted in the
misconduct of Mississippi officials. The historical record now clearly
establishes that Mississippi in the 1950s and 1960s was - politically
and institutionally - a white supremacist state, dominated by two
major segregationist organizations: the Citizens' Council and the
Sovereignty Commission.86 The Citizens' Council, founded a mere two
months after the issuance of the Brown decision in May 1954,87
reflected the intensity of whites' fears of integration; it was " 'the
greatest force we have in this battle to save the white race from
amalgamation, mongrelization, and destruction,' " noted Walter

85. A compelling example of the value of reopening cases to investigate prosecutorial
overreaching is the coram nobis litigation in the case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court upheld the conviction of Fred Korematsu for violation
of a civilian exclusion order issued as part of the government's internment of Japanese
Americans in 1942; the Court based its decision on government representations of "military
necessity" and the dangers posed by Japanese Americans on the West Coast. In the 1980s,
legal historian Peter Irons - in the course of conducting research for a book on the wartime
internment cases - discovered government documents establishing that key officials in the
Justice Department had lied to the Supreme Court about the existence of a national security
threat posed by Japanese-Americans. This discovery led to the fo rmation of a team of civil
rights lawyers and the reopening of the prosecutions of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabaya
shi, and Minoru Yasui through the filing of writs of error coram nobis. The coram nobis liti
gation resulted in the reversal of the Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui convictions. See
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYEO: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (1989); see also OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: THE FRED
KOREMATSU STORY (Korematsu Film Project, 2000) . According to Eric K. Yamamoto, a
member of the coram nobis legal team: "One woman in her sixties stated that she always felt
the internment was wrong, but that, after being told by the military, the President, and the
Supreme Court that it was a necessity, she had come seriously to doubt herself. Redress and
reparations and the successful court challenges, she said, had freed her soul." ERIC K.
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT280 (2001) [hereinafter YAMAMOTO ET AL.. RACE, RIGHTS, AND
REPARATIONS].
86. See NOSSITER, supra note 51, at 90-97; VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 48-53.
87. Thomas P. Brady, a Mississippi judge who was instrumental in the formation of the
Citizens' Council, published a fiery segregationist speech in June 1954; it was entitled Black
Monday, a reference to the date of issuance of the Brown decision. VOLLERS, supra note 51,
at 51.
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Sillers, the speaker of the state House of Representatives, in 1956.88
Byron De La Beckwith was a charter member.89
The Council "became virtually an arm of government and received
state funds . . . . It had developed into a quasi-political party along the
lines of those in totalitarian states, with ordinary citizens and public
officials uniting to enforce a common ideology, white supremacy,
through fear and intimidation."90 Unsurprisingly, their chief enemy
was the NAACP, the organization responsible for Brown and for the
vibrant leadership of field secretary Medgar Evers.91
In 1956, Mississippi instituted the Sovereignty Commission with
the following law: "It shall be the duty of the Commission to do and
perform any and all acts and things deemed necessary and proper to
protect the sovereignty of the state of Mississippi . . . from encroach
ment thereon by the Federal Government or any branch, department
or agency thereof; and to resist the usurpation of the rights and powers
reserved to this state . . . "92 From 1956 until its closure in 1973, the
Commission operated officially as a public relations agency for the
state of Mississippi and its "traditions," including segregation. Unoffi
cially, the Commission evolved into an elaborate and well-funded spy
agency, conducting a "paranoid, dirty war against suspicious outsiders,
civil rights workers, blacks seeking their rights, and men and women
suspected of carrying on interracial liaisons."93 The Commission
diverted funds to the Citizens' Council,94 interfered with voter registra
tion drives, and advised police officers on how to break the law with
out getting caught.95 As with the Citizens' Council, the Commission
attracted the attention and loyalty of Byron De La Beckwith.96
The unlawful, extremist, and even tawdry aspects of the
Commission's work remained officially secret from 1956 through 1989,
in part because of a 1977 decision of the Mississippi legislature to seal
the Commission's records for 50 years.97 After public pressure and
.

88. NOSSITER, supra note 51, at 90.
89. Id. For further background on Beckwith's life, see REED MASSENGILL, PORTRAIT
OF A RACIST: THE MAN WHO KILLED MEDGAR EVERS? (1994); R.W. SCOTT, GLORY IN
CONFLICT: A SAGA OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH (1991).

90. NOSSITER, supra note 5 1 , at 93.
91 . VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 51.
92. MISS. CODE ANN. § 3-1-11 (1972) (repealed 1977); VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 52.
93. NOSSITER, supra note 51, at 96.
94. VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 53.
95. NOSSITER, supra note 51, at 96. For further information about the Commission, see
VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 74-77. See also JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI (1994); ERLE JOHNSTON, MISSISSIPPI'S
DEFIANT YEARS: 1953-1973 (1990).
96. VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 53.
97. NOSSITER, supra note 51 , at 96.
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litigation by civil rights activists to unseal the records in 1989, how
ever, the Honorable William Barbour ordered their release:
The state of Mississippi acted directly through its State Sovereignty
Commission and through conspiracy with private individuals to deprive
the plaintiffs of rights protected by the Constitution to free speech and
association, to personal privacy, and to lawful search and seizure, and
statutes of the United States . . . . The final act of this tragedy was to
cloak state actions in secrecy until those who had been harmed by these
acts had died.98
Significantly, these records also provided evidence of the
Sovereignty Commission's long-term surveillance of Medgar Evers
and of its collusion in the second Beckwith trial in 1964.99 In 1989,
j ournalist Jerry Mitchell of the Jackson Clarion-Ledger obtained a
Sovereignty Commission file entitled "Medgar Evers: Race Agitator,"
which revealed that the Commission had investigated the background
of potential jurors in the second trial; Mitchell's subsequent
journalistic investigations of the Commission's possible jury tampering
triggered the momentum that eventually resulted in the reopening of
the Evers case in 1990.100 These disclosures, along with additional
breakthroughs such as the discovery of the murder weapon, critical
new witnesses, and a boastful confession, contributed to the successful
outcome of the 1994 Beckwith trial.101
The successful reopening of the Medgar Evers case inspired and
reinvigorated efforts to reopen other high-profile cases whose histo
ries reflected government misconduct and neglect.102 For example, a
primary impetus of the movement to reopen the Chaney/Schwerner/
Goodman case is the aim to expose the involvement of government
· officials in the murders and in their delayed prosecutions. Rita
Schwerner noted:
I believe that there should be a trial so there is a public recognition of the
state and individuals who didn't want to get their hands dirty in the reign
of terror. The reasons I think that's important is so that we can teach our
children and grandchildren what can happen if government is com
plicit.103
The well-documented historical record of Freedom Summer - the
summer of the three civil rights workers' murders - contains
numerous instances of federal, state, and local governmental intransi98. Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 264.
100. Id. at 264-72.
101. DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 195-220.
102. David Snyder, Evers Case Inspires Others: Hopes Renewed for New Trials, TIMES
PICAYUNE, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al.
103. Mitchell, supra note 72, at lA (internal quotation marks omitted).
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gence and racial hostility.104 Segregationists and racial supremacists
not only worked hand-in-hand with governmental actors - they were
governmental actors, determined to use public authority and resources
to obliterate racial progress. For example, the mayor of Jackson,
Mississippi, embarked on the following preparations for the arrival of
activists:
"This is it . . . [t]hey are not bluffing, and we are not bluffing. We are go
ing to be ready for them . . . . They won't have a chance." The mayor ex
panded the city's police force from 200 to more than 300 officers. He
purchased 250 shotguns and a 13,000-pound armored personnel carrier
called "Thompson's tank," which had steel walls and bulletproof wind
shields. He had oversized paddy wagons built, brought in two-and-a-half
ton searchlight trucks, and arranged to use the fairgrounds as a makeshift
prison. The state legislature approved a request from the governor to
hire 700 additional state highway patrolmen.105
To further solidify their attempts at control, the legislature out
lawed the distribution of flyers urging boycotts and erected barriers to
the issuance of permits to operate the planned "freedom schools" for
activists. 106 In response to requests for assistance in protecting activists
during what promised to be a dangerous summer, FBI Chief J. Edgar
Hoover asserted that his agency was not a protection force and that
accordingly it would not "wet-nurse" student activists in Mississippi. 107
Government malfeasance in the Chaney/Schwerner/Goodman case
continued throughout the subsequent arrest, incarceration, disappear
ance, and murder of the young men. Even after the bodies were
unearthed and the young men's parents expressed the desire that they
be buried side by side, state segregation laws forbade such an inter
ment. rn8 Unsurprisingly, further government delay and inaction
resulted in the dismissal of state charges against the twenty-one men
eventually arrested and in the small number of individuals convicted
under federal civil rights laws.109 In the face of damning governmental
involvement and a paltry record of successful prosecutions, reopening
the case could serve as the necessary catalyst for reexamination of the
government's accountability for such murders.
As discussed in Part II, widespread violence against blacks and
other people of color has flourished in this nation's history, sometimes
with the government's imprimatur and sometimes even at the hands of

104. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; see also SALLY BELFRAGE,
FREEDOM SUMMER (1965); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 228-35.
105. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 229-30.
106. Id. at 230.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 231-35.
109. Id. at 235.
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the designated "protectors" themselves. This type of intimidation and
terror - whether actively encouraged or merely condoned by the
government
is government malfeasance. If permitted to remain
dormant and unchallenged, it generates repercussions not just with
respect to the past but also very much with respect to the present and
future. Contemporary manifestations of police brutality, hate crimes,
and government cover-ups are reinforced and indeed encouraged if
the historical record reflects a lack of recognition of and punishment
for past wrongs.no Reopening cases to obtain legal accountability for
public malfeasance - even in the context of individual prosecutions
- enhances respect for the rule of law and signals that the state itself
is not beyond the reach of the law.
-

2.

Individual Malfeasance

Martha Minow notes that individual prosecutions are "slow,
partial, and narrow," and that they fail to capture "larger patterns of
atrocity and complex lines of responsibility and complicity."111
Undoubtedly, reopening cases in which the historical records reflect
failed or unfiled prosecutions presents similar shortcomings; reopen
ing can neither undo the past nor adequately provide redress for long
standing harms. Nevertheless, such prosecutions (and convictions)
loom large in significance as markers of accountability - certainly not
"justice" in a comprehensive, restorative sense, but a kind of "justice"
nevertheless. Perhaps even starker significance would lie in the failure
to prosecute such cases; as one surviving family member of James
Chaney noted: "The perpetrators are walking the streets, and we all
know who they are. By not prosecuting, it's saying to the individuals,
'You can go home and tell your friends about it, and nothing will be
done.' " 112
In the Evers case, Byron De La Beckwith epitomized this sense of
"scot-free" gloating. For nearly three decades after the Evers murder,
Beckwith responded to inquiries about the assassination with a
gleeful, remorseless defense of the murder and of white supremacy
generally. For example, in October 1987, Beckwith wrote to the Hinds
County District Attorney's office to express thanks that his case was
not being reopened:

110. Alfieri proposes a way to address this need through the articulation of prosecuto·
rial race- and community-based duties to investigate and prosecute cases of racially moti·
vated violence. Alfieri, supra note 13, at 1228-58. Alfieri explores the model of prosecutor as
"heroic moral witness . . . to confront injustice," and points out that this model is useful in
that it "militates against the denunciation of the prosecutorial function as a blunt instrument
of white dominance." Id. at 1228.
111. MINOW, supra note 84, at 9.
112. Mitchell, supra note 72, at l A.

1254

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101 :1225

Surely, a 3rd trial of me would turn Jackson, and indeed much Of Hines
[sic] County, into a huge "Roman Circus fiesta" filling the air and streets
with the bitterness and blackness of beasts, topped off and stirred with a
vast multitude of trash of the white variety, and every afore named [sic]
participant among the multitudes of legal Leaders//?? ! ! dragging their
empty purses behind them like a passell [sic] of "pickers" going to 'de
cotton patch to empty a vast veritable fortune of funds (4 'dey services)
out of the pockets of the responsible, white, Christian tax paying public
- of them who like thee and me and our people for generations WHO
BUILT THIS REPUBLIC.1 13
When asked in the early 1990s whether the murderer of Medgar
Evers should be punished, he replied: " [I]t depends on why he was
killed. If he was killed in defense of the preservation of this white
Christian republic, that's not murder, that's self-defense."114
These comments, particularly when considered in light of the
ample evidence presented in the first and second Beckwith trials in
1964, fostered the widespread assumption that Beckwith had "gotten
away with" Evers's murder. Moreover, Beckwith's gloating taunts
suggested that he and other white supremacist defendants could act
with impunity in perpetuating their hateful ideologies. Ironically, even
when Hinds County prosecutor Bobby DeLaughter reopened the case
and developed substantial new evidence against Beckwith, he encoun
tered skepticism among those who thought that Beckwith was a guilty,
raving lunatic but that it was simply too late to go back and correct the
past:
I also received calls and letters from people on the opposite end of the
spectrum, who hoped we were not considering reopening the case, no
matter what the law was or what evidence we ever amassed. The decision
to prosecute any case should be based upon the law and the evidence,
but to this group, Beckwith's guilt was not the issue. I was repeatedly
told, "We know he's guilty, everybody knows that; but that's not the
point. . . . So, I would ask, "What is the point?" Without exception, I got
one of four responses: "He's too old"; "The case is too old"; "It will cost
the taxpayers too much money"; "It will open up an old wound."1 15
Despite these concerns, there is a compelling reason to pursue such
cases: namely, the recognition that individual prosecutions, for all
their limitations, are all that our criminal justice system affords as a
mechanism for legal redress.
In addition to accountability for, and acknowledgement of, the
government's role in these murders, there should be accountability
for, and acknowledgement of, individual acts as well. Minow links
these concepts of accountability to positive dimensions underlying the
1 13. DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 27.
1 14. Id. at 160; see also VOLLERS, supra note 51, at 280.
1 1 5. DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 24-25.
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notion of "vengeance": "Although this word may sound pejorative, it
embodies important ingredients of moral response to wrongdoing. We
should pursue punishment because wrongdoers should get what is
coming to them; this is one defense - or perhaps restatement - of
vengeance. " 11 6
As discussed in Part II, the specifics of the murders at issue are
almost breathtakingly galling and cruel. Accountability for individual
wrongdoing can also serve as a way of "correcting the record" and
honoring the memories of the lives lost through civil rights era
violence.117
B.

Due Process Concerns

Although legal accountability is the most commonly invoked
objective in the reopening of civil rights era ·cases, significant counter
vailing interests require careful consideration of the rights of individu
als who may be prosecuted or reprosecuted many years after the mur
ders in question. Federal constitutional guarantees under the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, the Sixth Amendment's
Speedy Trial Clause, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clauses - as well as analogous state constitutional rights should be implemented vigorously to ensure fairness to these defen
dants. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to address fully the history
and complexity of these issues in the context of constitutional and
criminal jurisprudence; rather, I aim to emphasize options that strive
to balance the rights of defendants with the valid imperatives in favor
of reopening. In my view, these considerations are countervailing but
not contradictory, and legal accountability can be established in long
dormant cases without sacrificing defendants', rights. Below, I briefly
address these concerns in the context of cases that have been
reopened successfully.
In reopening cases, a paramount concern is affording due process
to the individuals who may be named or renamed as defendants. In
the cases outlined in Part II, any surviving individuals who might be
named or renamed in future prosecutions are now elderly. When he
was convicted in 1994, Beckwith was seventy-three years old.118 In the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing case, Blanton was sixty-two
years old when he was tried in 2001; Cherry was seventy-two years old
1 16. MlNOW, supra note 84, at 10. Minow cautions, however, against the deterioration of
vengeance into "a downward spiral of violence, or an unquenchable desire that traps people
in cycles of revenge, recrimination, and escalation." Id.
1 17. For thoughtful analyses of the role of victims and the valuation of yictims' lives in
criminal jurisprudence, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994); Lynne N. Henderson,
The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985).
1 18. DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 129.
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when he was tried in 2002.1 19 Although it is a well-known tenet of
criminal jurisprudence that murder has no statute of limitations,120
both pragmatic concerns and abstract principles affect decisions of
whether to prosecute decades-old cases. Despite powerful demands
for legal accountability, equally important countervailing interests
exist: these can range from practical prosecutorial burdens (expense;
availability of witnesses; preservation of evidence; competence of the
defendant to stand trial) to individual constitutional rights under the
Double Jeopardy, Speedy Trial, and Due Process Clauses. The latter
concerns are briefly addressed below.
1.

Double Jeopardy Clause

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution commands that no person shall "be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."121 At first glance,
this language suggests that reprosecutions would be entirely prohib
ited, and that only first-time prosecutions resulting from reopened
investigations of long-dormant cases would be permitted. A closer
examination of Supreme Court precedent and commentary, however,
reveals otherwise.
With regard to being "twice put in jeopardy" "for the same
offence," the Court's dissection of the text can be divided into two
major parts. First, the Court has stated that double jeopardy bars any
criminal prosecution for the same offense for which the defendant has
already been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned.122 This interpretation
excludes mistrials and hung juries, thereby clearly allowing reprosecu
tions such as Beckwith's, whose first two trials ended in hung juries.123
A second strand of double jeopardy textual analysis and Supreme
Court j urisprudence is both more complex and more controversial.
For over eighty years, the Court has applied a "dual sovereignty
doctrine" in interpreting the "same offence" language in the context
119. All Things Considered: Man Goes to Trial for Crime Committed in 1963 (National
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 20, 2001).
120. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.S(a) (3d ed. 2000).
121 . U.S. CONST. amend. V. Many states afford analogous protections in their own con
stitutions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. l , § 15, cl. 5; TEX. CONST., art. I, § 14; N.Y. CONST., art.
I, § 6.
122. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
340 (1975).
123. In both interlocutory and post-conviction appeals, Beckwith unsuccessfully chal
lenged his 1994 trial as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Each time, the Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable because of the hung jury verdict and sub
sequent order of nolle prosequi. See Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1997), cert. de
nied, 525 U.S. 880 (1998); Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1 1 34 (Miss. 1 992); see also State v.
Shumpert, 723 So. 2d 1162 (Miss. 1 998); State v. Thornhill, 171 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1965).
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of multiple prosecutions; under this doctrine or "exception," succes
sive prosecutions by different sovereigns are permitted because differ
ent governments' laws by definition cannot define the "same
offence."124 The Court has justified this exception as rooted in feder
alism concerns. Without the doctrine, the Court has surmised, the
separation of powers between state and federal governments might be
jeopardized, leaving different jurisdictions in a "race to the court
house" to conduct the initial or exclusive prosecution of a defendant
whose act violated both state and federal law.125 Other federalism
based concerns delineated by the Court include the protection of: a
state's power to enforce its criminal laws;126 the federal government's
power to prosecute fully an offense that violates both federal and state
laws;127 and the balance of prosecutorial powers between the state and
federal governments.128
In the past thirteen years, the Court has zigzagged in its approach
to defining "same offence";129 however, it is clear tl].at the dual sover
eignty doctrine is viable for a broad range of reprosecutions. In
summary, the Court's jurisprudence permits the reprosecution of a
defendant whose alleged act violates both federal and state law,
regardless of which government has conducted the initial prosecution
and regardless of the outcome of that first prosecutionP0
124. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382-85 {1922) (upholding a federal prosecu
tion for violation of the National Prohibition Act after a state conviction for violation of
state Prohibition Laws); see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 190-95 (1959);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132 {1959); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932). For further background and commentary on the origins of the dual sovereignty doc
trine, see Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995) (noting that the Court had articulated the doctrine in
dicta as early as the mid-1800s in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); and Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852)),
and Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Obser
vations on Original Meaning and the A CLU's Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign
Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 693 (1994).
125. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985).
126. Id.
127. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
128. Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
129. In Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, the Court held that a successive prosecution is not
for the "same offence" if the crime on which each prosecution is based has an element not
included in the other. In Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990), overruled by United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 {1993), the Court adopted a new test, holding that the
"same offence" was one resting on the same conduct. This test, however, was short-lived; in
Dixon, the Court reinstated the old Blockburger test. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
130. Kevin J. Hellman, The Fallacy of Dual Sovereignties: Why the Supreme Court Re
fuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 149, 150-51 (1994). In Feb
ruary 2003, the state of Mississippi secured a conviction in a federal murder trial of a civil
rights era slaying; the case was a reprosecution following a lapse of over thirty years after the
original prosecution. Defendant Ernest Avants, charged in the Ku Klux Klan's 1966 killing
of Ben Chester White as part of a plot to assassinate Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was acquit
ted of state murder charges in 1966. Federal authorities resurrected the case in 1999 after an
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Many scholars have argued for the abolition of the dual sover
eignty doctrine as inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the
Double Jeopardy ClauseY1 Susan N. Herman notes:
A great deal has been written about the Supreme Court's dual sover
eignty doctrine, almost all of it critical. Commentators have virtually uni
formly argued against the dual sovereignty theory the Court has forged,
advocating its abolition or at least its limitation. About half of the state
legislatures have declined the broad power to reprosecute afforded by
the Supreme Court. . . . The influential Model Penal Code advocates
limiting the dual sovereignty exception to prohibit second prosecutions
by a separate jurisdiction in those circumstances in which a successive
prosecution would be prohibited in the same jurisdiction under the Dou
ble Jeopardy Clause as it is currently interpreted. Several state courts
have found the dual sovereignty doctrine to violate their state constitu
tional protections against double jeopardy.132
Criticism of the doctrine encompasses a broad range of constitu
tional, historical, textual, and policy concerns. These include argu
ments that this "two bites at the apple" approach may encourage
vindictive prosecutions, undermine public faith in the judicial system,
ignore defendants' rights at the expense of law enforcement impera
tives, and diminish critical values of finality and closure.133
In civil rights cases, some reject a broad dual sovereignty exception
in favor of a limited "civil rights exception" to allow federal criminal
civil rights prosecutions after state proceedings have resulted in
acquittals or insufficiently lengthy sentences.134 As Paul Hoffman
points out, the Reconstruction-era federal civil rights statutes,
particularly 18 U.S.C. Sections 241 and 242, were intended to express

ABC News producer pointed out to them that the alleged killing had taken place on federal
property, the Homochitto National Forest. See Reed Branson, Jury Convicts A vants in 1966
Murder, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 1, 2003, at Al; Jerry Mitchell, A vants Found Guilty in '66 Klan
Killing, CLARION-LEDGER, Mar. 1 , 2003, at lA.
131 . Amar & Marcus, supra note 124. at 11-27; Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sover
eigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 {1992); Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the ln
trtuling Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961); J.A.C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Suc
cessive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1 309 (1932); Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and
Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306
(1963); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King,
and the A CLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dual Sovereigmy Excep
tion to Double Jeopardy: In the Wake of Garcia v. San Amonio Metropolitan Transit Author
ity, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31 (1987); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereigmy Excep
tion to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383, 408-33 (1986); Lawrence
Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem ofSuccessive Prosecutions, 34 S. CAL. L. REV.
252 (1961); see also Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights "Ex
ception", 41 UCLA L. REV. 649 (1994)
1 32. Herman, supra note 131 , at 61 8-20 (citations omitted).
133. Hellman, supra note 130, at 153-55.
1 34. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 1 3 1 , at 661-71.
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the ultimate authority of the federal government to protect funda
mental rights, particularly when state institutions failed.135 In the South
of the 1960s, there were many such failures of state authority - the
cases of Viola Liuzzo, James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, Andrew
Goodman, to name a few - and federal criminal civil rights prosecu
tions stepped in to repair the breach.
Even when counterbalanced with the primary concerns addressed
in this Essay - that is, the strong arguments that militate in favor of
reopening and reprosecuting cases - the rights of individual defen
dants must be carefully considered. In its present form, the broad dual
sovereignty exception permits reprosecutions, but arguably at the
expense of these individuals' rights. Given these policy and constitu
tional tensions, perhaps the fairest and most viable approach to
reopening these cases is to focus on reprosecutions following mistrials
and hung juries (such as in the Beckwith case), and initial prosecutions
of individuals (such as in the Blanton and Cherry trials). These choices
raise different due process concerns, as discussed below.
2.

Speedy Trial Clause

The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial."136 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a defen
dant's speedy trial rights attach upon arrest and continue until convic
tion, acquittal, or a formal entry is made on the record that the person
is no longer under indictment. " [T]he Speedy Trial Clause has no
application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops
charges."137 Based on these strictures, Speedy Trial Clause challenges
in most reopened cases are either inapplicable or readily resolved if
the second prosecution proceeds from the arrest through trial phases
sufficiently expeditiously. The significant lapse of time in these cases is
typically not while an individual is under indictment, but rather
between successive prosecutions or between the crime and the initial
prosecution.138

135. Id. at 661, n.49. Hoffman notes: "The failure of state court juries to convict those
responsible for racist violence was one of the reasons public officials and private white su
premacists acted with impunity against the African-American population in the South for
nearly a century after Reconstruction ended." Id. at 661. Hoffman also cites United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the landmark federal criminal civil rights prosecution of Klans
men in the murder of Lemuel Penn, an African American, in Athens, Georgia, in 1964, after
two defendants were acquitted by state court juries. See Michal R. Belknap, The Legal Leg
acy of Lemuel Penn, 25 How. L.J. 467 (1982).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
137. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 , 7 (1982).
138. See, e.g., Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 503-05 (Miss. 2002) (rejecting a Speedy
Trial Clause challenge by defendants who had been reindicted, tried, and convicted thirty
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A notable exception is Beckwith's 1994 reprosecution, in which he
raised a Speedy Trial Clause challenge based on the five-year delay
between the hung jury verdict in the second trial in 1964 and the entry
of a nolle prosequi in 1969. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected
Beckwith's claim for three primary reasons: that Beckwith had not
asserted his right to a speedy trial during the relevant time period; that
his complicity with the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission's activities
fostered the delay; and that he had not been prejudiced by the delay
because all material evidence had been preserved from the earlier
trials.139
3.

Passage of Time

The third and final major due process concern in the reopening of
cases involves the lapse of time between the underlying act and the
final indictment and prosecution. Although the lack of a statute of
limitations for murder clearly reflects both the seriousness of the
crime and the desire that prosecutions should not be barred by the
mere passage of time, it is daunting to consider the possible effects of
gaps of twenty or thirty years on the viability of a case. In the civil
rights era cases discussed herein, the impetus for reopening involved
not so much an abstract sense that "justice must be done," but usually
a breakthrough in the discovery of new evidence or witnesses. Given
that key witnesses and defendants themselves are aged and possibly in
frail health, is it possible to guarantee due process after so much time
has elapsed? At what point, if any, does the passage of time eliminate
the ultimate possibilities for truth and justice?
The answer to this difficult question surely must be that each case
presents a unique path. In reviewing Beckwith's due process challenge
to his final prosecution, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied a two
part test to determine whether the thirty-year passage of time between
the first and third trials was inconsistent with due process. First, the
court asked, has the final preindictment delay caused actual prejudice;
and second, was the lapse in time intentionally used by the govern
ment to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant?140 In analyzing
the first prong, the court noted that Beckwith had not been precluded
in his third trial from presenting any facts or testimony that he could
have offered in his earlier trials; the court observed that the previous
testimony of the now-deceased witnesses had been read into the
record at trial. The court also was unconvinced that Beckwith's
claimed memory loss was insurmountable, given that the original trial
years after the original indictment, because the case had been dismissed in the same year as
the original indictment.).
139. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 565-67 (Miss. 1997).
140. Id.
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records contained detailed testimony of ·his contemporaneous recollec
tions: " 'Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or
misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process viola
tion from preindictment delay.' "141
With regard to the second prong, the court found that the delay
was not attributable to any government attempt to gain an "upper
hand" over Beckwith due to the passage of time; in fact, the court
found, the delay was more likely caused by complicity between the
state Sovereignty Commission and Beckwith in obfuscating the
connection between the Commission and possible jury tampering in
the earlier trials.142 It is likely that a similar analysis would apply to
other reopened cases in which defendants assert that the mere passage
of time should render their prosecutions invalid under the Due
Process Clause.
C.

Racial Healing

In addition to fostering some measure of legal accountability for
both public and private wrongdoing, reopening these cases may facili
tate a kind of racial healing of communities and individuals harmed by
the intractable, systemic violence of the era. Recognition of the need
for broad-based racial healing requires acknowledgement of broad
based racial injury; in this context, reopening individual cases signifies
that these murders inflicted long-term, devastating blows to the health,
safety, and welfare of black communities.
Harlon Dalton describes racial healing as involving "candidly
confronting the past, expressing genuine regret, carefully appraising
the present in light of the past, agreeing to repair that which can be
repaired, accepting joint responsibility for the future, and refusing to
be derailed by setbacks and short-term failure."143 To achieve this
healing, Eric Yamamoto urges the use of "praxis", "a pragmatic
search for healing understandings that resonate with racial communi
ties . . . understandings [that] emerge in bits and pieces from the disci
plines of law, theology, social psychology, political theory (particularly
peace studies), and indigenous healing practices."144
Can these objectives be consistent with the process and goals of
reopening cases? In some ways, yes. Minow notes, "Prosecution may
be essential . . . for the healing of social wounds caused by serious
violations, on the theory that a society cannot forgive what it cannot

141. Id. at 570 (citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN
BLACKS AND WHITES 100 (1995).
144. YAMAMOTO, supra note l, at 153-54 (1 999).
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punish."145 This concept of racial healing would also embrace Alfieri's
description of the prosecutor's role as "heroic moral witness . . . to
confront injustice."146 In this light, reopening also represents an
acknowledgement that coming to terms with the past is necessary for
racial progress. Public scrutiny can in turn lead to recognition of the
long-term harms - psychological, economic, legal, and political inflicted by the reign of supremacist terror.
The decades-long efforts of Myrlie Evers, Rita Schwerner, and
others represent the hope that racial healing will result from reopen
ing old wounds and exposing them to the fresh air of investigation.
Imagery of injuries and healing is pervasive in these efforts; for
example, with regard to the Evers case, Bobby DeLaughter asks:
[I]f justice has never been finalized in such a despicable and immoral
atrocity and pursuing it will open an old wound, is it not a wound that
needs to be reopened and cleansed, instead of continuing to fester over
the years, spreading its poison to future generations?147
It is far from clear, however, that criminal prosecution itself yields the
kind of broad-based healing needed to address long-term racial harms.
Criminal prosecution focuses on matters of adversarialism, proof,
culpability, and punishment; racial healing requires collaboration, a
lack of fingerpointing, confession, and forgiveness. As Minow
observes in evaluating the role of prosecutions as a response to mass
atrocities:
The trial itself steers clear of forgiveness . . . . It announces a demand not
only for accountability and acknowledgment of harms done, but also for
unflinching punishment. . . . Reconciliation is not the goal of criminal tri
als except in the most abstract sense. We reconcile with the murderer by
imagining he or she is responsible to the same rules and commands that
govern all of us; we agree to sit in the same room and accord the defe n
dant a chance to speak, and a chance to fight for his or her life . B ut re
construction of a relationship, seeking to heal the accused, or indeed,
healing the rest of the community, are not the goals in any direct sense.148
Ultimately, the goal of racial healing may be better served through
another mechanism, for example, a kind of "truth commission" as
discussed below, or through a combination of truth commission and
prosecution.

145. MINOW, supra note 84, at 58.
146. See Alfieri, supra note 13, at 1228.
147. DELAUGHTER, supra note 50, at 25.
148. MINOW, supra note 84, at 26.
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IV. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS:

COMPLEMENTS

OR A LTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION ?

In the movement to reopen these cases, traditional adversarial
goals of legal accountability coexist - sometimes ill-fittingly - with
nonadversarial goals of healing, reconciliation, and psychological
closure. While the former goals are usually effectuated within the
specific, narrow confines of individual prosecutions, the latter objec
tives are broader, more abstract, and usually more difficult to achieve
in a legal context. Accordingly, some have suggested that an
"American-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission" - modeled
in part on post-apartheid South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission - is needed to allow more full redress for the long-term
harms caused by anti-black violence and intimidation.149
Although other models for truth commissions exist, 1 50 South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission is both the most
famous and most pertinent in terms of significance to U.S. civil rights
history. Following the historic transition from an apartheid govern
ment to democratic rule, culminating in the peaceful election of
Nelson Mandela as the nation's first black president and the African
National Congress as the governing party in 1994, the Parliament
created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") in July 1995
to address the effects of South Africa's stark past of racial oppression
and other human rights violations. In establishing the TRC, the
Parliament drew upon the experiences of truth commissions else
where, as well as extensive public input.151
President Mandela, himself a political prisoner for twenty-seven
years under the White National Party's regime, joined hands with
former President F. W. de Klerk in urging an end to racial animus and
an embrace of a long-term reconciliation process.152 Accordingly,
he signed the bill establishing the TRC as a seventeen-member
Commission to include lawyers, psychologists, and scholars; he named
149. Church Bombing Trial in Birmingham, Alabama, and Civil Rights Era Hate Crimes,
supra note 64, at 2 (describing a "Transfonnative Justice" conference sponsored by the Bir·
mingham Civil Rights Institute in 2002, at which South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
former President F. W. de Klerk, and others discussed post-apartheid South Africa's estab
lishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
150. See MINOW, supra note 84, at 52-90 for an extensive discussion of the various roles
of truth commissions. See also Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission
for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497 (1994); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth
Commissions
1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 H UM . RTS. Q. 597 (1994); Margaret
Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin Amer
ica, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 262 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
-

151. MINOW, supra note 84, at 53.
152. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 85, at 433
(quoting Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47, 49-52 (1997)).

1264

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:1225

Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu to be its head.153
With a 150-person staff and a $40 million budget, the TRC was com
prised of three committees: one to investigate gross human rights vio
lations (the Committee on Human Rights Violations); one to consider
amnesty for those confessing to those violations (the Committee on
Amnesty); and one to consider nonmonetary reparations to victims of
those violations (the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation).154
The overarching objective of the TRC was to initiate and facilitate
an interracial reconciliation process in the context of a bloody, bitter
past of black oppression and terror; as noted by one of its architects,
Justice Minister Dullah Omar, "There is a need for understanding, but
not for vengeance, a need for reparation, but not for retaliation."155 A
related goal was to provide redress for the failures of the South
African legal system. Yamamoto notes:
Commission proponents believe that healing is achievable and that South
African society can move beyond apartheid if those who inflicted racial
wounds acknowledge the suffering they wrought and accept appropriate
responsibility. The Commission's work is deemed to be especially impor
tant by many in light of the perceived failure of the current South Afri
can courts and criminal laws to bring apartheid abusers to justice - as
evidenced by the recent acquittal of former apartheid Defense Minister
Magnus Malan and others on charges of ordering a massacre in a black
township.156
Certainly, there exist many differences between the South African
and American stories of racial oppression and civil rights era abuses;
moreover, it is still far too early in post-apartheid South Africa's own
history to ascertain whether the TRC was the best model for recon
ciliation and redress.157 It is beyond the scope of this Essay to examine
the benefits and drawbacks of the TRC in terms of South African
society; some aspects of the TRC model may, however, be useful in
devising ways to address the need for racial healing and reconciliation
153. Id. at 434.
154. Id.; see also MINOW, supra note 84, at 53.
155. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 85, at 434.
156. Id.
157. For more detailed background on and critiques of the TRC, see ANTJIE KROG,
COUNTRY OF MY SKULL (1998); John Dugard, Retrospective Justice: International Law and
the South African Model, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAw IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 269-90 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Wilhelm Verwoerd, Justice After
Apartheid? Reflections on the South African TRC, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 479 (Roy
L. Brooks ed., 1999); Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan K. Serrano, Healing Racial Wounds? The
Final Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T
ENOUGH 492 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999); African National Congress Statement to the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (August 1996), reprinted in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH
451 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999); Mark Gevisser, The Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997
(Magazine), at 32; Tina Rosenberg, A Reporter at Large: Recovering from Apartheid, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 18, 1996, at 86-87.
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in the context of reopening civil rights era cases. Assuming that any
one model is without problems would be both simplistic and unrealis
tic. Therefore, my limited goal in this discussion is to suggest ways in
which parts of the TRC model may be translatable to the context of
American racial progress.
Of the three TRC committee functions - investigation of human
rights violations; apologies from, and amnesty for, wrongdoers; and
reparations for victims - perhaps the most immediately useful
function to examine in this regard is the first.158 This nation's tragic
history of racial terror, particularly as manifested in the cases
discussed in this Essay, is a record of human rights violations woefully
underinvestigated and underaddressed. Despite efforts to reopen par
ticular cases, there still exist long-term harms - not only to individu
als, but to communities as well; some have suggested that there is a
link between these injuries and·present-day racial disparities in educa
tion, health, housing, and employment in Southern communities.159 An
investigatory forum would allow far broader latitude than a legal
forum in focusing on these issues and fostering solutions.
Critical to the investigatory function of the TRC was the catharsis
of personal storytelling by survivors, witnesses, and wrongdoers.
According to Archbishop Tutu and others, storytelling as the articula
tion of suffering is therapeutic, rehabilitative, and educational; it was
the first step toward forgiveness and reconciliation.160 Moreover, the
158. Of the three functions, amnesty for, and confession by, wrongdoers poses the
greatest inconsistencies with the option of reopening cases with an eye toward prosecution.
The TRC aimed " 'to encourage political criminals on all sides to confess in detail their
acts,' " hoping to assure " 'perpetrators of human-rights abuses a kind of giant national plea
bargain.' " YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 85, at 434.
Although the TRC was careful to define its amnesty provisions as conditional upon confes
sion and apology, these provisions were controversial and their long-term utility is still an
open question. In any event, in the U.S. context, it seems highly unlikely that either govern
ment entities or intransigent perpetrators such as Beckwith would be amenable to confession
and amnesty as a viable approach.
In contrast, the concept of reparations, while not inconsistent with the goals of criminal
prosecution, is still a nascent concept in American jurisprudence and is unlikely to be im
plemented in the context of repairing the harms in question. For further discussion of repa
rations in the U.S. context, see BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS
(1973); MITCHELL T. MAKI ET AL., ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: How JAPANESE
AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS (1999); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT
AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 365-89 (Roy L. Brooks
ed., 1999).
159. Church Bombing Trial in Birmingham, Alabama, and Civil Rights Era Hate Crimes,
supra note 64, at 2. For recent analyses of continuing racial disparities in American life and
their genesis in pre-civil rights America, see ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.

DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
(1993); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY (1997); GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING
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160. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 85, at 434.
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process of individual storytelling and "truth-telling" in the presence of
sympathetic witnesses even further enhances its restorative potential;
it empowers the speaker and calls attention to the significance of the
narratives being related. Psychological and political literature about
the nature of mass trauma further suggest that speaking out can be a
healing experience; Minow notes, "Coming to know that one's suffer
ing is not solely a private experience, best forgotten, but instead an in
dictment of a social cataclysm, can permit individuals to move beyond
trauma, hopelessness, numbness, and preoccupation with loss and
injury."161
Quite possibly, there could be enormous potential for healing,
reconstruction, reconciliation, and education if survivors of the terrors
of the civil rights era had public opportunities to come forward to
discuss the past. These survivors could include the families and other
loved ones of murder victims; they could also include people of all
races who may have witnessed or condoned anti-black violence, and
even those who survived growing up in segregationist, hostile commu
nities. Given the passage of nearly four decades since the worst anti
black violence of those times, the numbers of survivors who can testify
to these harms are fewer and fewer; moreover, an argument could be
made that healing and reconciliation are unlikely to occur now if it has
not already occurred. The experiences of those who persisted in
reopening the 1990s prosecutions of Beckwith, Blanton, Cherry,
Frank, and others, however, suggest that the psychological, emotional,
and even spiritual benefits are as great as the legal achievements. The
language of "cleansing moments" and "healed wounds" connotes a
deeper sense of closure than guilty verdicts and punishment would
accord. In discussing the benefits of the TRC's reconciliation objec
tives, Tutu remarked: "Retributive justice is largely Western. The
African understanding is far more restorative - not so much to
punish as to redress or restore a balance that has been knocked askew.
The justice we hope for is restorative of the dignity of the people."162
Perhaps an American-style TRC would evoke similarly restorative
responses.
With this more expansive focus of storytelling and truth-telling in
mind, an American-style TRC could adopt broader objectives with
regard to the usefulness of its testimony and findings. In addition to
serving as valuable histories of the civil rights movement, these narra
tives could provide the bases for curricular reform in primary and
secondary education, legislative proposals, and other policy initiatives.
These goals may seem far removed from the initial impetus to reopen
cases for prosecutorial purposes, but they are not inconsistent
1 61. MINOW, supra note 84, at 67.
1 62. Rosenberg, supra note 157, at 90 (quoting Archbishop Desmond Tutu).
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with prosecuting individual cases; in fact, they may aid the task by
encouraging political momentum and personal courage. Both the 1993
South African Interim Constitution and TRC leaders explicitly
invoked the African concept of "ubuntu," or humane interconnected
ness, to explain their preferred approach to achieving justice through
community healing. As Yamamoto explains:
Ubuntu is the idea that no one can be healthy when the community is
sick. "Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human. If I under
mine your humanity, I dehumanise myself." It characterizes justice as
community restoration - the rebuilding of the community to include
those harmed or formerly excluded.163
V.

CONCLUSION

It is tempting to view the movement to reopen civil rights murder
cases as attributable to an interesting but ultimately quaint preoccupa
tion with the past. As this nation moves thirty, forty, and more years
away from the era of Emmett Till, James Chaney, Michael Schwerner,
and Andrew Goodman, collective memories and outrage fade. For
those who still cling to the anachronistic hope of finding justice and
closure in these cases, the ever-dwindling availability of witnesses and
resources serves as a painful reminder that America has entered a new
century with different priorities and politics. In this light, is the search
for cleansing moments and retrospective justice an irrelevancy?
A closer look at the racial realities of today suggests otherwise.
White supremacists164 and other hate groups continue to proliferate,
now focusing their attention not only on the old familiar targets of
racial and religious minorities, but also on lesbians and gays, abortion
providers, immigrants, and the U.S. government itself.165 With the rise
of the Internet and other technological resources, right-wing extremist
groups can now organize and disseminate their ideological weaponry
quickly and vividly to a wide variety of consumers, including
children.166 The proliferation of bias and hate crimes underscores the
fact that we are not a nation that has left behind the challenges of a
generation ago; we are a nation still riven by racial and economic divi
sions.

163. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS, supra note 85, at 435.
164. Loretta J. Ross & Mary Ann Mauney, The Changing Faces of White Supremacy, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 552-57 {Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
165. Id. at 556; see also NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIND THE MASK OF CHIVALRY: THE
MAKING OF THE SECOND KU KLUX KLAN {1994).
166. Peter Stills, Dark Contagion: Bigotry and Violence Online, PC/COMPUTING, Dec.
1989.
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In this light, the concept of reopening cases to come to terms with
the past appears not anachronistic and irrelevant, but compelling and
promising. Imperatives of legal accountability - combined with moral
concerns of healing, truth, and reconciliation - drive us to consider
whether coming to terms with America's racial past may provide the
key to a just future. Reopening cases to achieve ubuntu
community
restoration through humane interaction - may very well be the best
path to retrospective as well as forward-looking justice.
-

